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Bankruptcy is an integrated legal solution to the problem of 
overwhelming debt.  Evidence suggests that the architects of the modern 
Bankruptcy Code, in 1978, were genuinely concerned about offering ample 
relief to American families to cope with the burgeoning, emerging consumer-
credit economy.1  A few years before, the Brookings Institution had released 
a landmark study documenting gaping holes in the existing structure, con-
sisting of bankruptcy law and a patchwork of state laws.2  The study noted 
that many types of debts could not be discharged in bankruptcy and that the 
bankruptcy process provided almost no effective treatment for problems in 
paying debts secured by collateral, such as home mortgages or car loans.3  
Aggressive garnishment laws and strong rights for secured creditors led 
many people to file bankruptcy under creditor duress, often without sufficient 
contemplation of their options.4  The 1973 Bankruptcy Review Commission 
Report recommended major changes to the bankruptcy laws to give consum-
ers more help with their debt problems.5  These recommendations focused on 
encouraging consumers to consider repayment as an alternative to straight 
liquidation bankruptcy.6  The Commission warned that dramatic reforms 
were needed to provide more relief to individuals in financial trouble because 
the existing bankruptcy system was inadequate.7 
In reaction to these criticisms and empirical findings, the drafters of the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code—and the legal advocates who advised them—
designed a complex system to help consumers.  Even in 1978, household 
finance was complicated.  Consumers in financial trouble were delinquent on 
both secured and unsecured debts; these debts were owed to a mix of 
government-guaranteed and private lenders, had different maturities, and 
 
1. See William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Alternative 
Approach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129, 1132 (1983) (noting that Congress “modernized” the bankruptcy laws 
in 1978 in response to a noticeable increase in consumer credit during the mid-twentieth century).  
The Bankruptcy Code resulted from more complex political considerations than just a two-sided 
conflict between debtor interests and creditor interests.  See generally Eric A. Posner, The Political 
Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1997) (arguing that a 
“satisfactory explanation of the Bankruptcy Code must take into account the interests of all relevant 
parties and the extent of their political power”). 
2. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BROOKINGS INST., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, 
PROCESS, REFORM (1971). 
3. Id. at 57–58 (“If much of his debt is secured, a bankrupt will gain little from his discharge, 
because it does not affect valid liens.  After bankruptcy he will either have to pay his secured 
creditors or possibly have the property repossessed.”). 
4. Id. at 47–53 (reporting that the main immediate cause of bankruptcy was a threat of legal 
action such as garnishment, repossession, or a lawsuit). 
5. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 93-137, at 11–14 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
6. Id. at 157–60. 
7. See id. at 2–5 (describing several problems with the bankruptcy system that led to the 
establishment of the Commission). 
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bore different interest rates and fees.8  With disparities in state laws, creditors 
had varying enforcement tools available to them to exert leverage on strug-
gling debtors.  The 1978 Bankruptcy Code offered consumers complex, 
sophisticated tools to address their debt problems.  Consumers were given 
their choice of two chapters of bankruptcy relief: Chapter 7 (liquidation) and 
Chapter 13 (debt repayment over three to five years).  This new, improved 
system, which bifurcated options, offered families in financial trouble a rich 
array of tools to eliminate, reduce, or restructure debts.9 
The creation of Chapter 13 was seen as a cornerstone of the improved 
system of legal relief for consumers.10  The 1973 Commission Report had 
enthusiastically recommended the expansion of the repayment bankruptcy 
system, concluding that “[n]o feature of the present Bankruptcy Act has re-
ceived as much general acclaim as Chapter XIII.”11  On the Commission’s 
advice,12 the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code added numerous additional 
features to the prior Chapter XIII, including christening it with a new Arabic 
numeral in its name.  These additional features were intended to improve the 
relief that bankruptcy provided to financially distressed individuals.13  The 
new Chapter 13 clarified that no minimum amount of repayment was 
required, loosened eligibility requirements for debtors, and added significant 
tools to permit debtors to catch up on missed payments for secured debts.14  
 
8. See Carl J. Palash, Household Debt Burden: How Heavy Is It?, FRBNY Q. REV., Summer 
1979, at 9, 10–12 (charting the distribution of household debt and discussing consumer 
delinquency); David F. Seiders, Fed. Reserve, Div. of Research & Statistics, Recent Developments 
in Mortgage and Housing Markets, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 173, 178–79, 184 (1979) (surveying 
changes to the lending market and noting the increase in private lenders). 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. This sentiment was reflected in the Senate Report for the enacting statute: 
In theory, the basic purpose of Chapter XIII has been to permit an individual to pay his 
debts and avoid bankruptcy by making periodic payments to a trustee under bankruptcy 
court protection, with the trustee fairly distributing the funds deposited to creditors 
until all debts have been paid.  The hearings record and the bankruptcy literature show 
uniform support for this principle.  In practice however, the results have been less than 
satisfactory, even though chapter XIII has been available since 1938. 
  . . . . 
  The new chapter 13 undertakes to solve these problems insofar as bankruptcy law 
can provide a simple yet precise and effective system for individuals to pay debts under 
bankruptcy court protection and supervision. 
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 12–13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5798–99. 
11. 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 157. 
12. See id. at 162–67 (recommending improvements to Chapter XIII). 
13. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 232–33 (1989) 
[hereinafter AS WE FORGIVE]. 
14. See Melvin Kaplan, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Attractive 
Alternative, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 1045, 1047–51 & nn.23, 34 (1979) (describing the new debtor-
eligibility requirements, noting that the new Chapter 13 only mandated specific payments to a small 
subset of creditors, and explaining the debtor’s ability to cure or waive defaults on secured debts in 
a Chapter 13 plan, even over creditor objections). 
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Additionally, debtors no longer needed the consent of their creditors to re-
duce their debt obligations.15 
Advocates, academics, judges, and legislators heralded the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code as a consumer protection victory.16  At the center of the 
celebration was Chapter 13.  Law review articles announced that the 
“underlying premise” of the reform was to relegate Chapter 7 to a last-resort 
option and that some practitioners would realize that Chapter 13 was “an 
inexpensive, effective means” of helping debtors.17  Congress had given 
consumers substantially more relief, essentially promising all that the prior 
Chapter VII and Chapter XIII options had provided, and then some.  One 
commentator has described the “myth” of the enactment of Chapter 13 as 
follows: 
  Once upon a time, a benevolent government passed a law to help 
poor but honest debtors protect their homes from foreclosure and their 
encumbered personal property from repossession. . . .  [T]he idea was 
for [Chapter 13] debtors to be able to complete their plans 
successfully, then all could live happily ever after . . . .18 
The exaltation of Chapter 13 in part reflected the success of bankruptcy 
experts in getting their recommended changes enacted into law.  The 1973 
Commission Report devoted most of its recommendations to a legal redesign 
that would encourage debtors to file repayment bankruptcies.19  The 
Commission Report also fully embraced the concept of consumers making 
informed, uncoerced choices about how best to rehabilitate their 
households—a vision of legal relief reflected in offering debtors two options 
 
15. See id. at 1050–51 & nn.52–54 (outlining the new “cram down” provision of Chapter 13). 
16. See, e.g., Consumer Debt: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th 
Cong. 385 (1996) (statement of Ford Elsaesser, Vice President, American Bankruptcy Institute) 
(“When Congress created the modern bankruptcy code in 1978, it made bankruptcy a much more 
debtor-friendly law.”); Tamar Lewin, Business and the Law: Lively Debate on Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1983, at D2 (reporting that consumer advocates declared the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 a victory). 
17. E.g., Kaplan, supra note 14, at 1058. 
18. Gordon Bermant, What Is “Success” in Chapter 13? Why Should We Care?, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 20, 20.  Before the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the federal government had 
apparently preferred Chapter XIII, but it remained frequently used only in some areas.  See Max 
Siporin, Bankrupt Debtors and Their Families, SOC. WORK, July 1967, at 51, 53 (“Although the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts strongly favors the use of Chapter XIII 
proceedings when feasible, only a handful of the district courts are partial to this plan . . . .”). 
19. The Commission Report contained an entire chapter on “Plans for Debtors with Regular 
Income” despite only a tiny fraction of cases being filed under the then-existing Chapter XIII.  See 
1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 157–67 (discussing various recommendations in light 
of the Commission’s conviction that usage of Chapter XIII “should be fostered,” and noting the 
Commission’s goals were “to discover reasons why Chapter XIII has not been more popular” and to 
“enhanc[e] the effectiveness of [Chapter XIII] without making it compulsory”).  Even a 
contemporary critique of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code offered suggestions for further reforms that 
would continue to “result in greater use of and larger repayment plans in chapter 13.”  Vukowich, 
supra note 1, at 1132. 
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for bankruptcy.20  In the aftermath of the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code, a “national campaign to sell judges, attorneys, and ultimately debtors 
on the benefits of Chapter 13” was launched.21  As one law journal opined, 
“Chapter 13 often offers a far more effective solution to a debtor’s problems 
than a straight liquidation under Chapter 7.”22  And indeed, Chapter 13 fil-
ings skyrocketed during the first years under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 
increasing from about 15% of all consumer filings in 1978 to nearly 30% by 
1982.23  For the last two decades, approximately one-third of all consumer 
filings have been in Chapter 13.24 
The first major study of consumer bankruptcy relief under the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code halted the victory celebration.  Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth 
Warren, and Jay Westbrook’s book As We Forgive Our Debtors, published in 
1989, documented that many of the improvements in the law were not trans-
lating into on-the-ground relief for families.  Their most controversial finding 
was that only one in three cases filed under Chapter 13 ended in a completed 
payment plan.25  Two out of three families did not receive a Chapter 13 
discharge.  This modal outcome was contrary to the careful statutory scheme 
of court-approved debt reduction, development of a budget, repayment over a 
period of years, and discharge of any remaining obligations.26  Mincing no 
words, As We Forgive Our Debtors concluded, “In short, there are a lot of 
people in bankruptcy who bought a bill of goods when they filed Chapter 13.  
These Chapter 13 failures were cheated by a system that made unjustified 
promises of successful repayments and reestablished creditworthiness, and 
then left them to founder alone.”27  This critique of the discharge rate for 
Chapter 13 was driven in large part by comparison to the alternative of 
Chapter 7, which has consistently had a discharge rate exceeding 95%.  The 
one-in-three success rate of Chapter 13 paled against Chapter 7 outcomes. 
The sting of the Chapter 13 critique was compounded by a cost 
comparison.  Not only did Chapter 13 deliver little protection to most of 
those who turned to it for help, but the complexity of Chapter 13 meant that 
the attorney’s fees were significantly higher than for Chapter 7.28  The 
 
20. 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 79–81. 
21. AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 339. 
22. C. William Schlosser, Jr., Chapter 13 Bankruptcy as an Alternative to Chapter 7, 18 COLO. 
LAW. 2089, 2089 (1989). 
23. AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 266 n.13 (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 402 tbl.F3B (1982)). 
24. For spreadsheets containing annual statistics on the number of total filings and filings under 
each chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, see Bankruptcy Statistics, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx. 
25. Id. at 217. 
26. See AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 37–39 (describing the detailed procedure for plan 
confirmation and discharge). 
27. Id. at 339. 
28. Id. at 250. 
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difference has persisted over time.  In 2007, the median cost of a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy was $2,500, 250% higher than the cost of a Chapter 7 case.29  
Chapter 13 also requires significantly more debtor involvement, typically 
including a court appearance for plan confirmation and the submission of 
regular payments for a period of years.30  By contrast, debtors usually get a 
discharge in Chapter 7 within four months of filing.31 
Defenders of Chapter 13 were furious.32  Their friends in Congress 
pushed for an official government study of the issue, presumably to disprove 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook.  A few years later, however, the resulting 
report confirmed that only one in three debtors obtained a discharge.33  In the 
face of repeated studies that confirmed the original Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook finding,34 an alternate theory of bankruptcy emerged.  Advocates 
for Chapter 13 began to opine that the discharge rate was a poor measure of 
 
29. The median Chapter 13 filer in 2007 paid $2,500; the median Chapter 7 filer in 2007 paid 
$1,000.  Katherine Porter, Driven by Debt: Bankruptcy and Financial Failure in American 
Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS (Katherine Porter ed., 
forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter BROKE] (manuscript at 1, 20) (on file with author).  Using standard 
“no-look” fees in each district, a government study found that the median fee for Chapter 13 one 
year later in 2008 was $3,000.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY 
REFORM: DOLLAR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 24–26 (2008). 
30. AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 37–38. 
31. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, 
2010 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 13 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 BAPCPA REPORT], available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2010/ 
2010BAPCPA.pdf (reporting that for Chapter 7 consumer cases filed on or after October 17, 2006, 
and closed in 2010, the mean interval from filing to disposition was 178 days and the median 
interval was 120 days); AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 33, 44 n.26 (reporting that the median 
time from filing under Chapter 7 to discharge was four months in the study sample); Discharge in 
Bankruptcy, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/ 
DischargeInBankruptcy.aspx (“Typically, [a Chapter 7 discharge is granted] about four months after 
the date the debtor files the petition with the clerk of the bankruptcy court.”). 
32. Strong proponents included the Chapter 13 trustees—whose trade group devoted an annual 
meeting to criticizing the Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook finding—and several prominent 
bankruptcy judges and law professors. 
33. Michael Bork & Susan D. Tuck, Bankruptcy Statistical Trends: Chapter 13 Dispositions 4 
graph 1 (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Working Paper No. 2, 1994) (studying termination data 
for Chapter 13 cases filed between 1980 and 1988 and reporting that 36% of Chapter 13 cases 
received a discharge). 
34. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: 
Comparisons Across the States, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2000, at 22, 22 (“Completion rates 
[for Chapter 13 filings] hover nationally at about one-third of confirmed plans . . . .”); Henry E. 
Hildebrand III, Administering Chapter 13—At What Price?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 1994, 
at 16, 16 (“The trustees estimated that the completion rate of chapter 13 cases averaged 32.89 
percent.  This is consistent with conventional wisdom that approximately two-thirds of chapter 13 
cases fail to reach discharge.”); Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and 
Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 505 (2006) (“The overall discharge 
rate for the debtors in the seven districts covered by the Project was exactly the oft-repeated statistic 
of one-third.”). 
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Chapter 13’s usefulness.35  Aside from the potential for greater creditor 
recovery in Chapter 13,36 Chapter 13 devotees noted that debtors received an 
array of benefits from Chapter 13 other than discharge.  They pointed out 
that Chapter 13, unlike Chapter 7, permitted a debtor to cure a default on a 
secured debt, such as a home at risk of foreclosure, even if state law did not 
permit reinstatement and deceleration of the debt.37  They emphasized that 
this benefit did not require the completion of the repayment plan.38  Defend-
ers of Chapter 13 also argued that the temporary stay of foreclosure or 
repossession during the pendency of Chapter 13 helped debtors make plans 
for the future even if cases ended without a discharge and debtors lost their 
property.39  Finally, some argued that debtors benefitted from the Chapter 13-
imposed discipline of living on a trustee-supervised repayment plan with a 
strict budget.40  This rehabilitation aspect, it was asserted, might improve 
debtors’ financial prospects even if they dropped out of Chapter 13 because 
they had now learned self-restraint and financial-management strategies from 
trying to hold themselves to a repayment program.41 
 
35. See, e.g., Bermant, supra note 18, at 65 (“Arguments are made that completion is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for success.”). 
36. In part because of the high rate of dismissals and conversions, recovery by nonpriority 
unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 appears to be quite low.  The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
data (on file with author) show that only one in three Chapter 13 plans even proposed to make any 
payment to unsecured creditors.  Data from the U.S. Trustee Program for fiscal year 2008 show that 
there was zero payout to unsecured creditors in 32% of all Chapter 13 filings.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. TR. PROGRAM, FY-2008 CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE AUDITED ANNUAL REPORTS (June 
28, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter13/docs/ch13ar08-AARpt 
.xls. 
37. See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1202 (2d ed. 2009) 
(“Chapter 13 gives a debtor a chance to retain her house, car, and other property, even if the debtor 
currently is in default and facing foreclosure.”). 
38. See Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten 
Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981–1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
121, 143 (1994) (“Some judges and lawyers reacted to our 1981 findings by asserting, among other 
things, that success in chapter 13 is not properly measured merely by completion of a plan because 
many debtors get benefits from incomplete cases, including an opportunity to negotiate with 
mortgage holders and other creditors.”). 
39. See, e.g., Bermant, supra note 18, at 67 (noting that an alternate measure of success in 
Chapter 13 could include debtors retaining their collateralized property); see also Teresa A. 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, What We Really Said About Chapter 
Thirteen, NACTT Q., Apr. 1992, at 18, 19 [hereinafter What We Really Said] (“The two-thirds 
statistic does not mean that these Chapter 13 [bankruptcies] were total failures—for example, 
foreclosure of a home may have been forestalled, or the petitioners might have learned more about 
household budgeting by developing a plan.”). 
40. Colloquium, Panel Discussion: Consumer Bankruptcy, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1356, 
1358 (1999) (relating comments by a private practitioner that “there is nothing like having [a 
bankruptcy trustee] spend three-to-five years helping the debtor understand how . . . to budget,” an 
education that one “cannot find . . . in a Chapter 7 case,” and by a law professor that “one of the 
remarkable things . . . is that Chapter 13, even in those areas of the country without a formal 
education program, does by its nature provide some education”). 
41. See What We Really Said, supra note 39, at 19 (“The two-thirds statistic does not mean that 
these chapter 13 [sic] were total failures—for example, . . . the petitioners might have learned more 
about household budgeting by developing a plan.”); cf. Siporin, supra note 18, at 53 (“There has 
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Adding punch to this alternate theory was the fact that Chapter 13 cases 
most commonly ended because the debtors stopped making their payments.42  
In other words, the debtors themselves were the “cause” of the failed cases.43  
In this view, the early exits from Chapter 13 were the outgrowth of providing 
consumers with more tools for relief.  The alternate theory posited that the 
dropout rate for Chapter 13 was evidence that giving consumers choices 
allowed them to tailor their uses of the legal system to their individual needs 
and desires.  The argument was plausible, at least in theory.  Even Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook backed down a bit, admitting in a later work that it 
was a “difficult issue . . . whether Chapter 13 ‘works’ for those petitioners 
who choose it.”44 
The furious debate over Chapter 13 cooled to an intellectual stalemate.  
Chapter 13 critics did not give up, but neither did supporters.  Eventually, the 
fervor died down for a lack of new arguments.  In successive reforms, 
Congress added amendments to encourage—and then to force—a greater 
number of troubled debtors into Chapter 13.45  Today, Chapter 13 is 
 
been little recognition that [Chapter XIII] actually constitutes a federal social service program.  It 
provides individualized assistance to meet social needs and is so understood by a number of the 
debtors.”).  Siporin offered as an illustration of the potential “disciplining” effect of repayment 
bankruptcy a situation in which being on a debt plan would help a debtor’s alcoholic husband 
assume his family responsibilities.  Id. 
42. Cf. 2010 BAPCPA REPORT, supra note 31, at 16–17, 63 tbl.6 (reporting that 49% of 
Chapter 13 cases nationwide, and up to 85% in some districts, were dismissed for failure to make 
plan payments). 
43. For example, perhaps debtors simply could not respond to obvious economic incentives and 
were steering themselves into the wrong chapter.  Cf. Michelle J. White, Economic Versus 
Sociological Approaches to Legal Research: The Case of Bankruptcy, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 685, 
691 (1991) (“Another implication of the economic theory of bankruptcy is that debtors will only 
choose chapter 13 when the terms of the repayment plan make them no worse off than they would 
be if they filed under chapter 7.”). 
44. What We Really Said, supra note 39, at 19. 
45. To be sure, the support of Chapter 13 in the decades after the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment 
in 1978 may have come from those who either clearly or latently supported pro-creditor positions, 
rather than those concerned with improving outcomes for debtors.  The political-economy story of 
recent amendments to consumer bankruptcy law is that the consumer credit industry exerted more 
influence than debtor interests, resulting in the expansion and entrenchment of Chapter 13.  See 
Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy “Reform” in Congress: Creditors, Committees, 
Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527, 527–29, 553 
(2004) (concluding that both ideology and money played a significant role in support for the 
legislation).  Experts in consumer bankruptcy, including trustees, judges, and academics, do still 
play a role in law reform, and some experts profess strong support for Chapter 13 because they 
believe it provides better solutions for debtors in certain situations.  See, e.g., In re Wilks, 123 B.R. 
555, 562 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (“Congress intended Chapter 13 to be the primary tool of wage 
earners to save their home.”); Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own 
Informed Choices—A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 
186 (1997) (noting that Chapter 13 is “often touted as a means to save a home” and commenting 
that when saving a home is not possible under Chapter 7, Chapter 13 may be more likely to succeed 
in that goal). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965680
2011] The Pretend Solution 111 
 
 
considered a bedrock of consumer bankruptcy, esteemed by many for its 
nuanced approach to debt relief.46 
But the basic question of whether Chapter 13 dismissals constitute 
successful outcomes for the millions of debtors who have taken that path has 
never been tested empirically.47  Decades after the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, knowledge of outcomes of Chapter 13 can largely be 
reduced to one enduring fact: only one in three cases ends in a Chapter 13 
discharge.  There is simply no evidence of whether the remaining cases in 
which debtors do not complete repayment plans are successful in providing 
relief to debtors.  The result is a gaping hole in the knowledge necessary to 
assess the efficacy of the bankruptcy system.  This lack of data is particularly 
remarkable because dropping out is more common than completion and be-
cause that ratio of outcomes has persisted for more than thirty years.48 
This Article exposes the real outcomes of Chapter 13 bankruptcy for the 
first time.  It provides evidence of what problems families tried to solve in 
bankruptcy and what problems they did solve in bankruptcy.  These data 
come from hour-long telephone interviews conducted as part of my original 
empirical study of 303 debtors from across the nation.  Study participants 
failed to receive a Chapter 13 discharge, and a strong majority exited the 
bankruptcy system entirely (rather than converting to Chapter 7).  My find-
ings lay bare, against theories and conjecture, what really happens to families 
that file Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
The data show that participating families had two major goals in filing 
Chapter 13: to keep their homes,49 and to reduce personal and family stress 
 
46. See, e.g., BARRY E. ADLER ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 
25, 39, 517–20, 621 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that while most individuals now choose Chapter 7, 
Chapter 13 is valuable because it allows a debtor to discharge claims not dischargeable under 
Chapter 7 and to circumvent recalcitrant creditors, and explaining that Chapter 13 empowers 
debtors to assume ownership in restructuring their obligations through the proposal of 
individualized repayment plans, which may allow them to retain otherwise nonexempt assets); 
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY & JEFFREY W. MORRIS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND 
CREDITOR LAW 253 (3d ed. 2006) (observing that many attorneys and judges extol the “wonders” 
of Chapter 13 relief and noting that Chapter 13 offers a number of benefits not available under 
Chapter 7, including the ability to retain possession of all property, avoid the need to pay off claims 
by way of full redemption in a Chapter 7 case, and obtain a stay in favor of co-debtors). 
47. Even the most comprehensive study, the Chapter 13 Project, relies solely on the discharge 
rate as its measure of debtor success.  See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 34, at 504 (explaining that 
the study relied solely on discharge and refiling rates because they are the only reliable measure of 
debtor success); see also Bork & Tuck, supra note 33, at 4 (“Data are not collected on why a 
chapter 13 case has been dismissed or at what stage of the life cycle the case is dismissed.”).  To the 
extent research has gone beyond counting legal outcomes, it has focused primarily on attempting to 
predict what determines plan completion rather than examining real outcomes in noncompleted 
cases.  See David A. Evans & Jean M. Lown, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: Successful Versus 
Unsuccessful Debtors, 18 PAPERS W. FAM. ECON. ASS’N 33, 33 (2003) (“With the dismal track 
record of chapter 13, it is important to understand why plans fail (cases are dismissed) or how 
debtors who succeed in chapter 13 differ from debtors who fail to complete their plans.”). 
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
49. Among all debtors, saving a home was the most commonly identified “most important” 
goal of bankruptcy.  About three-fourths (74%) of the debtors in the study were homeowners, and 
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by gaining control over their financial circumstances.50  The data show that 
families temporarily accomplished these goals during the time they were in 
Chapter 13.  Most kept their homes during bankruptcy.  And with collection 
calls halted and repossessions held at bay, these families reported signifi-
cantly reduced stress and less marital strain.  For many, Chapter 13 may have 
seemed like divine relief. 
But these families received only half answers to their prayers.  Once 
their cases were dismissed, the relief quickly evaporated.  Within a few 
weeks, 14% of homeowners had already lost their homes, and another 59% 
were in default and on the path to foreclosure.  Similarly, the respite from 
collection calls and repossessions was temporary.  In this study’s sample, 
one-fourth (26.6%) of Chapter 13 cases converted to Chapter 7, which would 
discharge the debtors’ unsecured debts.  The remaining (74.4%) cases ended 
in dismissals.  This meant families still owed the full amount of their debts 
plus interest that accrued during the time they were in Chapter 13.51  As 
creditors and debt collection agencies learned that the bankruptcies were 
dismissed, collection efforts began again.52  For the majority of families dis-
missed from Chapter 13, relief was only temporary.  They spent money that 
they could ill afford in order to file bankruptcy, only to find themselves 
unable to accomplish even their most basic goals and without a better 
solution for their problems.53 
We might expect these families to be angry and disappointed.  For them, 
Chapter 13 was the law’s most potent remedy—a huge step that signaled that 
they were taking action to protect themselves.  Filing gave them a welcome 
respite from debt pressures, and it fostered the sense that they could recapture 
the lives they had known before financial problems overtook them.  Their 
phones stopped ringing with creditor calls, and they could enjoy living in 
their homes without risk of foreclosure.  When they could no longer sustain 
payments in Chapter 13, they held on to their illusions as they quietly exited 
the system.  Fully 83% of families reported that filing bankruptcy was a 
“very good” or “somewhat good” decision, despite its failure to produce any 
lasting solution.  Some clung to the belief that “something would work out,” 
 
70% of these homeowners said that keeping their homes was their single most important goal in 
bankruptcy. 
50. Nearly all families (99%) interviewed said it was a very important or somewhat important 
goal for bankruptcy to help them organize and get control of their financial situation; 86% said it 
was very important or somewhat important to stop harassment from creditors by filing bankruptcy. 
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2006) (providing that discharge is only available upon completion of 
the plan, with limited exceptions). 
52. In the first weeks after their cases were dismissed, 40% of families had already received one 
or more collection calls. 
53. A minority of households, approximately 20%, reported positive outcomes despite having 
dismissed or converted their cases.  Subpart IV(C) of this Article, and particularly Figure 7 therein, 
describes these data.  Fewer than one in five households (19%) agreed that their bankruptcies ended 
because they had found better solutions.  Just over one in four (27%) agreed that their bankruptcies 
ended because they had accomplished their bankruptcy goals. 
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while others acknowledged that they had run out of options.  Some blamed 
themselves, saying they had failed the system, and others blamed individual 
actors such as their attorneys or the trustees in their cases.  But very few 
questioned whether the Chapter 13 system was itself fatally designed and 
only infrequently capable of solving their financial problems. 
Policy makers follow a similar path.  We might expect the benevolent 
policy makers who designed the bankruptcy system to be protesting loudly 
and pressing hard for changes in the bankruptcy laws to improve alternatives 
for families mired in debt.  Instead, both debtors and policy makers continue 
to embrace Chapter 13.54  Despite the evidence of high dismissal rates, the 
policy debate largely accepts the alternate theory—that incomplete 
Chapter 13 cases produce solutions on par with completed cases.55  Others 
blame any problems with Chapter 13 on bad lawyers, inattentive trustees, or 
ill-informed judges.56 
Chapter 13 is a pretend solution.  I use this term to mean a social 
program that does not work as intended but is not critiqued or reformed 
because its flaws are hidden.  The consumer bankruptcy system fits this 
description, as the data show.  While this study’s findings are new, the 
systemic failure of Chapter 13 has existed for decades.  The data in this 
Article are a clarion call to redesign bankruptcy relief to be simpler and 
blunter, even if the resulting system of rough justice leaves a few sophisti-
cated or lucky people with fewer legal options.  The tyranny of choice in 
consumer law is that the complexity is so expensive and difficult to navigate 
that most people do not receive any relief, and policy makers never have to 
confront those poor outcomes. 
Chapter 13 also is a cautionary tale about what happens when policy 
makers—with the best of intentions—offer up a program to help consumers 
 
54. See Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Data Show Trends in Post-BAPCPA Filings, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., July–Aug. 2008, at 14, 14 (noting that during the first twelve months after passage of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Chapter 13 cases rose 
from 29% of all bankruptcy filings to 42%); Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How 
Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1933, 1953 (2011) (identifying ways in which BAPCPA was designed to push 
debtors toward Chapter 13 by raising procedural barriers to Chapter 7 and structuring incentives for 
bankruptcy attorneys to advise their clients to choose Chapter 13). 
55. Cf. Bermant, supra note 18, at 65 (noting that, for some judges, trustees, attorneys, debtors, 
and secured creditors, completion is not necessary for success); Norberg & Velkey, supra note 34, 
at 504 (observing that some bankruptcy trustees do not consider noncompletion to be equivalent to 
failure and that in some cases the debtor merely needs the brief protection of Chapter 13 to regain 
financial footing). 
56. See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of 
Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 440, 450 (1999) 
(suggesting that judges, trustees, creditors, and debtors’ attorneys could reduce dismissed cases if 
they had data on factors that correlate with case dismissal, but ultimately finding no data that are 
useful predictors of case outcome); Bork & Tuck, supra note 33, at 6–8 (noting that the likelihood 
of a discharge or dismissal depends on the expertise and attentiveness of judges, trustees, and 
lawyers, which varies by district). 
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but fail to adequately monitor outcomes.  The program’s mere existence im-
munizes policy makers from the need to assess whether the program is an 
effective solution.  In bankruptcy, Congress can push more debtors into 
Chapter 13, confident that its supporters will defend the move as a benevo-
lent act rather than a callous way to leave debtors at the mercy of their 
creditors.  New efforts to point out continued suffering from overwhelming 
debts may be met with a wagging finger and a reminder that a good solution 
already exists, and if problems persist, perhaps it is the moral fiber of these 
troubled families that is the real problem.  Because experts can show that the 
legal tools work in hypothetical cases, any failures in real cases are the fault 
of the debtors themselves, not the design of the system. 
The result is an unholy contract between the helpers (policy makers) 
and the helped (bankruptcy debtors).  Neither side has succeeded, yet both 
are lulled into inaction.  The pretend solution is powerful because it does 
meaningful work for both parties.  Pretend solutions entrench the status quo 
and discourage efforts to argue that laws need to be improved.  Families 
content themselves with false hope, and policy makers content themselves 
with false promises. 
Pretend solutions are not unique to bankruptcy.  A number of problems 
may be declared solved, while in fact, the social policies are failing.  The 
data reported in this Article suggest ways to frame a theory of pretend 
solutions.  Complexity, for example, facilitates the repeated redefining of the 
purpose of a law, so that every twist and turn in the law creates the 
opportunity for the adoption of a new theory of success.  Similarly, expert 
participation in crafting a solution creates a powerful assumption from the 
outset that the program cannot be improved—and therefore does not need 
monitoring and assessment.  Not every program with some of the features of 
a pretend solution is a failure.  But these features, often viewed as markers of 
a generous and effective social program, can signal that the legal solution to 
a problem may be a mirage. 
This Article also illustrates the cure for pretend solutions.  Empirical 
research can expose pretend solutions or, if conducted early enough, prevent 
recently established programs from becoming pretend solutions.  For 
example, the federal government’s Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP) was rolled out with an identified goal of helping three to four mil-
lion homeowners stay in their homes.57  While there were no plans to report 
on whether that goal had been accomplished, the program was part of the 
 
57. See President Barack Obama, Address at Dobson High School, Mesa, Arizona: Remarks by 
the President on the Home Mortgage Crisis (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-mortgage-crisis (proclaiming that the 
housing plan “will enable as many as 3 to 4 million homeowners to modify the terms of their 
mortgages to avoid foreclosure”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Homeowner 
Affordability and Stability Plan Fact Sheet (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/20092181117388144.aspx (reiterating that the 
plan would “offer reduced monthly payments for up to 3 to 4 million at-risk homeowners”). 
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Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and therefore fell under the jurisdic-
tion of the Congressional Oversight Panel.58  The Panel, led by Elizabeth 
Warren, insisted on regular data reporting—and it cross-examined those data 
and reported them in accessible language.59  The conclusion was inescapable: 
HAMP was a dismal failure.60  Despite the Obama Administration’s efforts 
to redefine the goal of HAMP to claim success, the data and public reporting 
made clear that HAMP “failed to provide meaningful relief to distressed 
homeowners and, disappointingly, [that] the Administration inadvertently 
created a sense of false expectations among millions of homeowners who 
reasonably anticipated that they would have the opportunity to modify or 
refinance their troubled mortgage loans under HAMP.”61  This empirical 
analysis of outcomes revealed HAMP as a masquerade and prevented it from 
becoming a pretend solution.62  Because the failure of the existing program 
was obvious, policy makers must again confront the problem of unaffordable 
mortgages. 
The differences between HAMP (which was recognized as a 
nonsolution) and Chapter 13 bankruptcy (which has existed for decades as a 
pretend solution) suggest factors to consider in designing a legal solution to a 
social problem.  Clever, or even generous, front-end statutory solutions do 
not guarantee the desired outcomes.  Successful solutions require the estab-
lishment of objectives for the law and the simultaneous design of back-end 
program evaluations.  Without these checks, the law can continue to 
systemically underperform its objectives. 
The way to avoid pretend solutions is to focus sharply on outcomes, not 
intentions.  At the outset, policy makers should identify simple outcomes and 
 
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 5233(b)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. III 2009) (assigning to the Congressional 
Oversight Panel the duty of issuing regular reports on “the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation 
efforts”); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 43 (2009) [hereinafter OCTOBER 
OVERSIGHT REPORT] (stating that HAMP is funded by a government commitment comprised of 
funds from both TARP and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act). 
59. See OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 58, at 34–35 (detailing the Treasury 
Department’s data collection and reporting efforts and encouraging the Treasury to improve them). 
60. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT: EVALUATING PROGRESS ON 
TARP FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 5 (2010) (“The redefaults signal the worst form of 
failure of the HAMP program: billions of taxpayer dollars will have been spent to delay rather than 
prevent foreclosures.”); see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: A 
REVIEW OF TREASURY’S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 46 (2010) [hereinafter 
DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT] (reporting that HAMP had achieved only 483,342 active 
permanent modifications and calculating that since HAMP began, there have been just over nine 
foreclosure starts for every one HAMP modification). 
61. DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 60, at 124. 
62. See OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 58, at 136–40 (presenting the dissent of 
Congressman Jeb Hensarling, who nonetheless acknowledged that “[a] fair reading of the Panel’s 
majority report and my dissent leads to one conclusion—HAMP and the Administration’s other 
foreclosure mitigation efforts to date have been a failure”); see also 157 CONG. REC. H1994 (daily 
ed. Mar. 29, 2011) (introducing the HAMP Termination Act of 2011, which sought to “put an end 
to the poster child for failed Federal foreclosure programs”). 
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design ways to measure whether those ends are being achieved.  The result-
ing data will break the satisfying illusion of success and drive better social 
programs. 
II. A Primer on Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Law 
Today, nearly all consumers who file bankruptcy still have the option of 
choosing between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.63  Chapter 7 is more popular, 
accounting for about two-thirds of consumer filings in recent years.64  In 
Chapter 7, a debtor receives an immediate discharge of his unsecured debts 
in exchange for turning over all nonexempt assets for distribution to his 
creditors.  Because of relatively generous exemption levels, about 96% of 
consumer Chapter 7 cases are “no-asset” distributions,65 and debtors receive 
a discharge of their unsecured debts about four months after filing 
bankruptcy.66 
Chapter 13 attracts about one in three bankrupt households.67  Only 
individuals or families (not entities or businesses) with debts below statutory 
thresholds may file Chapter 13.68  Eligibility also depends on the debtor 
 
63. The “means test” incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 does screen Chapter 7 
cases for presumed “abuse,” and if the debtor cannot rebut the presumption of abuse, the case is 
dismissed or the debtor must convert to Chapter 13.  11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).  It appears that only 
a small number of people who have chosen to file bankruptcy since the 2005 law was implemented 
have been truly “forced” into Chapter 13.  About one-half of one percent of all Chapter 7 debtors 
are forced to convert to Chapter 13 after failing the means test and then losing litigation to rebut the 
means-test presumption that their Chapter 7 case is an abuse of the system.  See Katie Porter, Means 
Test Changes Won’t Mean Much, CREDIT SLIPS (Oct. 26, 2009, 5:34 AM), http:// 
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/10/means-test-changes-wont-mean-much.html (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. TR. PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/annualreport/docs/ar2008.pdf) (concluding that trustees 
filed motions to dismiss for abuse in only 0.4% of Chapter 7 cases in 2008).  The means test may 
operate primarily as a sorting mechanism to screen people into Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 before filing 
or to discourage any bankruptcy filing.  The initial empirical evidence, however, suggests that the 
inflation-adjusted median income of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers did not change between 2001 
and 2007, which is consistent with the idea that the means test did not dramatically influence either 
the bankrupt population or the selection between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.  Robert M. Lawless, 
Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A.E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth 
Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 349, 361–63 & fig.3 (2008). 
64. Katie Porter, Today’s Consumers Prefer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 3 to 1, CREDIT SLIPS 
(Mar. 22, 2010, 6:08 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/03/todays-consumers-prefer-
chapter-7-bankruptcy-3-to-1.html (noting that the rate of Chapter 13 filings was 38% in 2006–2007, 
31% in 2008, and 26.5% in 2009). 
65. Ed Flynn et al., Chapter 7 Asset Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2003, at 22, 22. 
66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
68. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006).  As of the date of the bankruptcy petition, a Chapter 13 debtor 
must have noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $360,475 and noncontingent, 
liquidated, secured debts of less than $1,081,400.  Chapter 13: Individual Debt Adjustment, ADMIN. 
OFF. U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/Chapter13.aspx. 
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having “regular” income,69 although that income could be from nonwage 
sources such as government benefits or family support.70 
Chapter 13 permits debtors to retain all assets, regardless of whether the 
assets are exempt under law.71  In return, debtors pay their “disposable 
income” to their unsecured creditors and make payments on their secured 
obligations.72  The repayment period is between three and five years.73  The 
bankruptcy court must confirm the repayment plan for it to take effect.74  The 
terms of repayment are complex, reflecting an interaction of legal require-
ments and negotiations with creditors.75  Generally, Chapter 13 debtors are 
required to live on modest budgets, which are reviewed by courts and bank-
ruptcy trustees at the time of plan confirmation.76 
Chapter 13 debtors can retain assets secured by collateral (homes, cars, 
boats, etc.) only if they can continue to make the ongoing payments on those 
debts during the repayment plans.77  For most collateral other than the 
debtor’s principal residence, Chapter 13 permits a debtor to restructure the 
terms of secured debts, typically by writing down the obligation to the value 
of the collateral.78  Home-mortgage debt may not be modified;79 this is the 
“cramdown” prohibition.80  However, Chapter 13 is widely used by 
 
69. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). 
70. See, e.g., In re Antoine, 208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that spousal 
support can be a source of regular income for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)); In re Dawson, 13 
B.R. 107, 109 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (noting that “persons who receive . . . various government-
provided benefits qualify as individuals with regular income”). 
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b)–(c). 
72. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B); see also id. § 1307(c)(6) (allowing dismissal or conversion of the case 
if the debtor fails to make payments). 
73. See id. § 1322(d) (stating that plans may be three to five years, depending on circumstances, 
but prohibiting courts from approving periods longer than five years in any case).  It appears that the 
majority of Chapter 13 debtors propose plans of five years in length.  See Scott F. Norberg & Nadja 
Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical Study of District Variations, and the Roles of Judges, 
Trustees and Debtors’ Attorneys in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 453–55 
& tbls.13 & 14 (2007) (reporting that median and modal plan length was 60 months for a sample of 
Chapter 13 cases filed in 1994 in seven judicial districts). 
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a). 
75. See id. § 1322(a)–(b) (listing both the minimum mandatory requirements a repayment plan 
must contain and the terms a debtor may include in his repayment plan). 
76. See id. § 1325(b)(1) (prohibiting confirmation of a plan unless it either pays objecting 
creditors in full or distributes all of the debtor’s “projected disposable income” as determined by the 
court). 
77. See id. § 1307(c)(6) (allowing a creditor to force the liquidation of a debtor’s property if the 
debtor stops making payments as required under the repayment plan). 
78. See id. § 1322(b)(2) (allowing modification of a secured creditor’s rights); id. 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (allowing confirmation of a plan that pays out only the allowed amount of a 
secured claim); id. § 506(a)(1) (restricting the allowed amount of a secured claim to the value of the 
collateral). 
79. Id. § 1322(b)(2). 
80. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also William Safire, Cramdown, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25wwln-safire-t.html 
(describing cramdown as a “vivid noun [that] has long enlivened the language of bankruptcy law”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965680
118 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:103 
 
 
homeowners facing foreclosure and has an explicit home-saving purpose.81  
Debtors are permitted to cure missed mortgage payments in their repayment 
plans, with foreclosure stayed as long as a debtor makes all ongoing pay-
ments as required by his mortgage loan while also catching up on all missed 
payments as set forth in his repayment plan.82 
A Chapter 13 trustee administers the case.83  The trustee collects 
payments from the debtor and makes distributions to creditors.84  At the end 
of the repayment plan, the debtor receives a discharge of any remaining 
amount of unsecured debt.85  The discharge does not affect liens on property, 
so if a debtor fails to make payments after bankruptcy on secured obligations 
such as home and car loans, he can lose that property.86  However, the dis-
charge prevents the creditor from suing the debtor for any deficiency 
outstanding after the collateral is sold and the proceeds applied to the debt.87  
The discharge basically functions as an injunction that protects the debtor 
from personal liability for any discharged obligations.  The primary excep-
tions to discharge are domestic support and educational obligations, which 
are not dischargeable in either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.88 
Chapter 13 is expensive.  Attorneys charge two to three times more to 
file a Chapter 13 case than to file a Chapter 7 case.  In 2007, the median 
attorney’s fees for Chapter 13 were $2,500, in comparison with $1,000 for 
Chapter 7.89  To put these costs in context, consider Chapter 13 debtors’ 
incomes at the time of bankruptcy.  In 2007, the median Chapter 13 debtor 
had monthly income at the time of filing of $3,058.90  To pay attorney’s fees 
in a lump-sum payment at the time of filing, as is required to file Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, families may have to save up for many months.91  Chapter 13 
permits debtors to pay their attorney’s fees as part of their repayment plans.92  
Most attorneys require a modest down payment of a few hundred dollars at 
 
81. See infra section IV(A)(1). 
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3), (b)(5), (c). 
83. Id. § 1302(a)–(b). 
84. Id. §§ 704(a)(1), 1302(b). 
85. Id. § 1328. 
86. See id. § 1328(a)(1) (exempting from discharge secured or unsecured debts when the last 
payment is after the end of the plan); id. § 1322(b)(5) (permitting the trustee to arrange plans for 
payment of secured and unsecured debt). 
87. See id. § 1328(a) (discharging debts except for those enumerated); id. § 506(a) (bifurcating 
the secured debt into an allowed secured claim that is still secured by the lien and an allowed 
unsecured claim subject to the discharge). 
88. Id. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5), 523(a)(8), 1328(a)(2). 
89. See supra note 29. 
90. Author’s calculations from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (on file with author). 
91. Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 292, 319, 
323 (2010). 
92. HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 1 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 16.4 (9th ed. 2009); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (requiring Chapter 13 plans to 
provide full payment of priority claims); id. §§ 503(b)(4), 507(a)(2) (granting priority to 
“administrative expenses” such as attorney’s fees). 
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the time that the petition is filed and receive the remaining fees in the first 
few payments under the repayment plan.93  There are no estimates of how 
many people are driven to Chapter 13 by the ability to finance attorney’s 
fees. 
When enacted in 1978, Chapter 13 offered “carrots” to incentivize the 
choice of repayment.94  Reforms have reduced many of those benefits, 
including a broader discharge for debts in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7.95  
Today, the “stick” of a means test labeling debtors as abusers of the 
Chapter 7 system96 will push a small fraction of debtors to file Chapter 13.  
But the vast majority of families choose Chapter 13 voluntarily.97  There is 
little systematic research on why families file Chapter 13 instead of 
Chapter 7.  In the study reported in this Article, only about half (47%) of all 
debtors even considered Chapter 7.  Those debtors were asked why they 
chose Chapter 13.  The most popular answers were wanting to keep assets 
such as homes or cars, attorney advice that Chapter 13 was better for their 
situation, and wanting to try to repay their debts. 
Despite successive reforms that have made Chapter 13 less generous to 
debtors, the percentage of Chapter 13 filings has barely budged from its one-
third share of bankruptcies filed.98  In 2010, over 400,000 households filed 
Chapter 13 cases.99  Chapter 13 is a centerpiece of the American bankruptcy 
system, emblematic of the focus on consumer choice and sophisticated legal 
tools that carefully balance the rights of debtors and creditors. 
 
93. See SOMMER, supra note 92, at § 16.4.1 (positing that an attorney’s assurance that his or her 
fee will be paid through the plan makes him or her more comfortable about taking the client’s case 
with only a modest down payment rather than a large advance payment of all or most of the fee). 
94. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 346 (6th ed. 2009) (“Congress attempted to influence debtors to choose Chapter 13 by 
offering carrots, such as a broader discharge and the ability to deal with secured creditors over 
time.”). 
95. See Thomas Evans & Paul B. Lewis, An Empirical Economic Analysis of the 2005 
Bankruptcy Reforms, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 327, 338–39 (2008) (describing the reduced 
number of items included in Chapter 13’s “super-discharge” after the amendment of the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
96. See supra note 63. 
97. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 94, at 347 (observing that “almost 90 percent of 
those who now file in Chapter 13 are below-median debtors who could have filed in Chapter 7 
despite the means test”). 
98. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
99. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—BUSINESS AND 
NONBUSINESS CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 
12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2010, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/1210_f2.pdf. 
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III. Methodology of the Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
A. Study Design 
The purpose of this study is to provide a systematic examination of what 
actually happens to the households whose Chapter 13 cases do not end in 
plan completion and a Chapter 13 discharge.  Such data are not available 
from public court records.  As a matter of practice, almost all dismissed cases 
are officially terminated by a trustee’s motion to dismiss the case, most 
commonly because the debtor quit making payments.100  This is because 
debtors’ attorneys generally do not go to the expense and hassle of filing 
motions to dismiss cases.  Instead, the attorneys instruct the debtors to simply 
stop paying and let the trustee dismiss the case.  For this reason, the proce-
dural outcome of trustee dismissal reveals almost nothing about the reasons 
for the outcome of a case.  To see why, imagine two situations that could 
result in a dismissed Chapter 13 case.  In the first situation, the debtor con-
firmed a repayment plan but lost her job.  She stops paying the trustee 
because she cannot afford to complete her repayment plan.  She will exit 
bankruptcy still delinquent on all her debts.  In the second situation, the 
debtor confirmed a repayment plan.  She then made eighteen consecutive 
plan payments, paying off all the arrearages on her mortgage and becoming 
current on the loan.  This debtor received a raise recently and thinks she can 
manage to pay off her modest unsecured debts on ordinary nonbankruptcy 
terms.  She stops paying the trustee because her attorney told her this would 
end her bankruptcy, which she no longer sees herself as needing.  Both 
debtors will exit the Chapter 13 system with a case disposition of “dismissed 
for failure to make plan payments.”  However, these debtors have very dif-
ferent outcomes from bankruptcy if measured in terms of their future 
economic prospects and relief from prior debts.  The publicly available court-
record data mask these differences and do not permit a researcher to disprove 
the alternate theory of Chapter 13. 
To see the real outcomes from bankruptcy, I conducted a study of 303 
debtors who did not receive a discharge.  In the remainder of this Article, I 
refer to the study as the “Chapter 13 Dropout Study.”  The cases included in 
the study ended in either dismissal or conversion; they share the fact that the 
debtors “dropped out” of Chapter 13.  Shortly after their cases ended, debtors 
were interviewed about their goals for bankruptcy and whether they achieved 
these goals.  The resulting data reveal why Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases 
end—not merely in legal terms (i.e., the debtor stopped paying the trustee), 
but also in terms of life events.  In the subparts below, I provide more details 
on the survey’s techniques and sample.  Before turning to those issues, I 
briefly describe the key research questions of the survey interview. 
 
100. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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The main goal of the interview was to measure whether dismissed or 
converted Chapter 13 cases are successes or failures from debtors’ 
perspectives.101  The first part of the interview asked debtors what goals they 
wanted to accomplish in bankruptcy.  Debtors were asked how important it 
was to them to accomplish each specific named goal.  This was repeated for 
more than a dozen goals that were likely reasons the debtors chose to file 
bankruptcy generally and Chapter 13 in particular.  Debtors were also asked 
if they had any other goals and to identify their single most important goal 
from a list of all self-identified “very important” goals.  Additional questions 
were asked about saving property, particularly preventing a home 
foreclosure, because prior research has established that 75% of Chapter 13 
debtors are homeowners and that nearly all of these homeowner debtors are 
delinquent on their home mortgages at the time of filing.102  The questions 
regarding bankruptcy goals permit me to move beyond the mere legal end 
result of a nondischarge case disposition and instead consider a more nu-
anced set of outcomes from bankruptcy.103 
The second part of the interview then asked debtors about whether they 
achieved their bankruptcy goals.  Various measures were used to probe 
overall outcomes and goal-specific outcomes from the Chapter 13 
bankruptcies.  Some questions sought debtors’ subjective responses on the 
degree to which they felt they had accomplished their overall goals or their 
single most important goal in bankruptcy.  Other questions were objective.  
For example, debtors were asked if they still owned their homes, and if not, 
why they no longer had their homes.  They were also asked if they were cur-
rent on their home mortgages or facing foreclosure.  Other measures of 
outcome included questions about debtors’ financial situations at the time of 
the interview (which usually occurred about two months after case 
termination) and questions about whether they thought filing bankruptcy was 
a good decision.  In addition to financial characteristics, the interview que-
ried debtors about aspects of psychological and social well-being—such as 
self-perceptions of stress and spousal relations—before, during, and after 
bankruptcy.  These are crucial nonfinancial benefits of bankruptcy; prior 
 
101. These nondischarge-terminated bankruptcy cases could have resulted in greater payouts to 
creditors than if the debtor either had filed Chapter 7 or had not filed bankruptcy at all.  Creditor 
recovery is uncontrovertibly an aspect of the design of the American bankruptcy system.  But the 
fresh start for debtors—embodied by the discharge—is the heart of the Bankruptcy Code, and this is 
a debtor-centric goal.  See generally Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of 
Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006) (describing the primacy of the fresh start 
in the consumer bankruptcy system). 
102. Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEXAS L. 
REV. 121, 141 nn.125 & 127 (2008). 
103. Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Beyond the Bottom Line: The Complexity of Outcome 
Assessment 6–11 (Sept. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1479051 (describing differences between end results and outcomes).  In the bankruptcy 
context, the end result is a dismissed case.  But as Lewinsohn-Zamir notes, “Individuals regard 
various factors, in addition to end-results, as part of the ensuing outcome itself.”  Id. at 4. 
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research suggests that collection calls and “dunning letters” are a primary 
reason that consumers decide that they should seek bankruptcy relief.104  
Collectively, the interview questions were designed to permit an evaluation 
of whether a debtor can be fairly characterized as having achieved a mean-
ingful fresh start despite not receiving a discharge. 
The interview did not assume that bankruptcy was the only or best 
solution to these families’ financial problems.  The interview asked debtors 
why they had stopped paying their trustees and whether this was due to fi-
nancial hardship such as a decline in income.  Debtors were also asked 
whether their cases had ended because they found alternative solutions that 
they preferred to bankruptcy (such as negotiating outside of bankruptcy with 
a creditor, committing to a debt-management plan, etc.).  Because these pro-
cesses do not require the participation of a lawyer or court and occur outside 
the insular judicial process of bankruptcy, they are much harder to observe. 
B. Sampling Frame 
This project documents the outcomes of debtors who exit the system.  It 
is not an effort to predict completion of Chapter 13.  The relevant sample, 
therefore, selected debtors whose Chapter 13 cases had ended, instead of all 
debtors who had filed Chapter 13 cases.105  In limiting the sample to noncom-
pleted cases, I make the assumption that the one-third of all Chapter 13 cases 
that end in discharge are “successes.”106 
To obtain a sample of debtors whose Chapter 13 cases were terminated 
without discharge, I worked with a data service, AACER, which gathers data 
from all bankruptcy court files in the nation.107  AACER provided me with a 
complete list of all Chapter 13 cases in the United States that ended without a 
discharge for a given time period.108  Eligible cases included those that were 
dismissed (regardless of whether by debtor’s motion, trustee’s motion, etc.) 
or converted to Chapter 7.109  For any given time period, AACER’s list was 
the universe of Chapter 13 cases that ended without a Chapter 13 discharge. 
 
104. See Mann & Porter, supra note 91, at 327–28 (suggesting that “in practice it is the 
‘dunning’ stage of collection that is important in the etiology of bankruptcy filings”). 
105. The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project sample is appropriate for a study attempting to 
predict plan completion because it contains approximately 600 Chapter 13 cases filed in 2007.  The 
final result of those cases can be determined by checking the court records in 2012, five years after 
the cases were filed. 
106. For additional discussion of how data from the Chapter 13 Dropout Study can be 
combined with the one-third discharge rate for an overall assessment of the Chapter 13 system, see 
infra Part V, and subpart V(A) in particular. 
107. AACER is an acronym for Automated Access to Court Electronic Records and is part of 
Epiq Systems, a company that provides data from bankruptcy court records.  AACER also provided 
the lists for the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project and is affiliated with the Harvard Bankruptcy 
Data Project, with which I am a fellow.  I thank Mike Bickford, Anna Biggs, and other AACER 
staff for their assistance. 
108. Cases from Puerto Rico were excluded from the sample. 
109. Cases that converted to Chapter 11 or 12 were excluded from the sample. 
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Because AACER conducts daily monitoring of all bankruptcy cases in 
the nation, it can generate lists of “fresh” cases that were just terminated.  
However, the terminated cases themselves may have been filed anytime 
during the preceding five-year period.  This is because cases have different 
longevities.  Some cases terminate shortly after being filed, and others may 
not convert or dismiss until near the end of their repayment plan.  Prior 
research found that the typical case that does not end in discharge terminates 
within two years of being filed.110  The majority of cases were filed in the 
latter half of 2008 or during 2009.  However, the sampling procedure gave all 
cases that terminated before plan completion an equal chance of being in the 
sample, regardless of the duration of time between filing and termination. 
This sampling strategy is a new and innovative approach to studying 
outcomes in Chapter 13.  Prior studies have interviewed an entire sample at 
the same moment in time (e.g., one year after the bankruptcy cases were 
filed).111  The result of such an approach is that debtors are all at different 
points in their cases—some still trying to confirm a repayment plan, some 
having dropped out of bankruptcy without a discharge, some making pay-
ments under a plan, etc.—when the data are gathered.  Unless such a study is 
conducted five years after all cases have been filed, the sample will not be 
representative of the full panoply of case outcomes.  Sampling from recently 
terminated cases allowed me to interview debtors within a few weeks of their 
cases ending.  This reduced problems in memory distortion from inter-
viewing people about events that occurred in the past.  It also likely boosted 
the response rate and reduced the number of people whose contact 
information in the bankruptcy court records was not valid.  Virtually all 
debtors who participated in this study were interviewed within two months of 
the termination of their cases. 
There remained some variation, however, among cases in how much 
time elapsed between when a debtor quit paying the bankruptcy trustee and 
when the case was terminated.  Figure 1 is a histogram of how many months 
elapsed between when debtors last paid the bankruptcy trustee and the time 
of the interview.  Over half of debtors were interviewed within three months 
of stopping payments, and 86% were interviewed within six months of 
stopping payments.  The modest observed variation is largely a result of 
“local legal culture,” a longstanding feature of the consumer bankruptcy 
system.112  Some trustees are more aggressive in dismissing a case after a 
 
110. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 34, at 529 (reporting that cases that were dismissed or 
converted after plan confirmation lasted, on average, less than two years, whereas cases that were 
dismissed or converted before plan confirmation lasted, on average, less than six months). 
111. The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project used this strategy.  See ELIZABETH WARREN & 
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 182 app. (2003) (detailing the sample and data 
collection procedures of the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project). 
112. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 556–61 (1993) (describing how lawyers’ desire to fit in to the legal culture in 
different cities drives differences in bankruptcy practice); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & 
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missed payment, while others give debtors a grace period of three or so 
months in which they may catch up on their missed payments.  Additionally, 
some debtors responded more quickly to the invitation to participate in the 
study than other debtors. 
I obtained six lists of terminated Chapter 13 cases from AACER.  The 
first list was treated as a pretest of survey procedures and consisted of a ran-
dom sample of one hundred cases, from which seventeen interviews were 
completed.  The remaining five lists make up the study sample.  The lists 
each contained a single week of terminated cases from across the nation.  
While I could not identify any literature on seasonal variation in case 
termination,113 I spread the draws of samples over several months.  The lists 
were drawn for a given week from February, March, April, June, and August 
in 2010.  This choice also permitted me to manage the scale of data collec-
tion with only a single research team member conducting the vast majority of 
interviews, eliminating the problem of intercoder reliability.114 
  
 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from 
the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 806–07 (1994) (describing the 
“pervasive, systematic influence” of local legal culture on the bankruptcy system). 
113. There is some research that seeks to identify seasonal effects in bankruptcy filings.  
Compare AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 344–45 (finding some seasonality in bankruptcy 
filings, including an increase at the end of the summer, but “no post-Christmas rush in the early 
spring”), with Mann & Porter, supra note 91, at 319–22 (finding some evidence of a seasonal filing 
effect in early spring because the tax refund seems to be used to fund attorney’s fees). 
114. Of course, even with one person, there is the question of whether that coder was reliable.  
While an estimate of reliability was measured for the court records data, see infra subpart III(C), 
there is no feasible way to construct such a measure for interviews, where replication is not 
possible. 
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 Figure 1.  Months Elapsed Between Study Interview and When Debtor 
Stopped Paying Trustee 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 303 
 
From each list of terminated cases, I drew a random sample.  The lists 
varied in size from one hundred cases to five hundred cases.115  The total ran-
dom sample from the five lists was 1,200 cases.  This number was ultimately 
reduced by eleven debtors, for reasons I explain in subparts III(C) and (D), 
infra. 
Like most empirical studies, the Chapter 13 Dropout Study reflects data 
from particular moments in time.  The cases in this sample ended in 2010 but 
began in varying years, primarily 2008, 2009, and 2010.  The U.S. economy 
during this period has been weak, and some cases were filed during a 
recession; families have struggled in particular with mortgage debts and with 
the effect of declining home prices.  Because many people file Chapter 13 to 
save their homes, the mortgage problems of this recession may have skewed 
the sample and the data.  It is certainly possible that a study replicating this 
one in later years (or hypothetically occurring in prior years) would produce 
different results.  There are reasons, however, to doubt the degree of distor-
tion from the recession.  First, the one-in-three discharge rate for Chapter 13 
has been relatively steady for the last thirty years, including during other 
 
115. The variation in size of the random samples was a result of differing capacities for 
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recessions.116  More recently, the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project has 
updated the status of the approximately seven hundred Chapter 13 cases in its 
random national sample.  In the first four years after being filed in 2007, 59% 
of Chapter 13 cases in that sample ended in dismissal or conversion.117  
While this is below the typical 66% figure, a few more cases will likely end 
without discharge in the final year of repayment.  This statistic, plus its pro-
jected trend, suggests that any distortion from nontraditional mortgages, high 
unemployment, or the recession is not wholly altering outcomes in 
Chapter 13.  If anything, the finding from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy 
Project suggests that slightly fewer debtors are dropping out of Chapter 13 
during the recession.  This would mean that the Chapter 13 system may be 
performing slightly better than usual during the period of the Chapter 13 
Dropout Study.  At this point, one cannot untangle whether any variation 
from the 66% nondischarge rate stems from the recession, the 2005 amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code, or the timing of sampling. 
To the extent that there are changes in Chapter 13 outcomes from 
various economic factors, it remains important to observe how Chapter 13 
debtors fare at this moment in time.  While financial distress from 
overindebtedness occurs in boom economies as well, it may be most socially 
important to have a well-functioning bankruptcy system in dire economic 
conditions such as those the United States has experienced in the last few 
years.  I also cannot eliminate the possibility that Chapter 13 outcomes are 
skewed in a positive direction by the unusual economic conditions.  For 
example, people may be less likely to seek Chapter 13 relief when their 
homes are declining in value; with fewer homeowners coming into 
Chapter 13, the statistics on home-saving may be dampened.  On balance, 
given the steady rate of dismissal in this time period, I believe that this 
study’s sample is useful for making generalizations about the Chapter 13 
system. 
C. Data Collection Process 
The primary research instrument in this study was a computer-assisted 
telephone interview.  The software prompted the interviewer with the appli-
cable questions for each debtor (including adjustments based on prior 
answers), displayed them on screen for the interviewer to read aloud to the 
debtor, and simultaneously permitted the interviewer to record the debtor’s 
answers. 
The questions, as described above in subpart III(A), focused on 
documenting debtors’ outcomes at the time they exited Chapter 13.  The 
design of the interview involved several stages.  First, I spoke with 
 
116. For data on Chapter 13 plan completion since 1978, see supra notes 23–26 and 
accompanying text. 
117. Data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (on file with author).  The remaining 
41% of cases in the sample are either pending or a Chapter 13 discharge has been entered. 
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professionals who work in the Chapter 13 system, including trustees, judges, 
and attorneys, to help identify appropriate options for closed-ended 
responses.  After drafting the interview questions, I repeatedly revised and 
tested them.  This included having the interview questions reviewed by a 
sociologist with expertise in surveying bankruptcy debtors and by the UC 
Berkeley Center for Survey Research.  After revisions, the questions were 
tested for ease of reading aloud and to gauge the length of the interview.  I 
paid considerable attention in writing the questions and responses to ensuring 
that the interview was logically organized and that people with high-school 
educations who had no legal training could understand the questions.  When 
the interview was finalized, a custom computer-assisted interview platform 
was written.  Practice interviews were completed before the data collection 
began to familiarize the interviewer with the database and the questions. 
To invite debtors to participate in the interview, I mailed a letter to the 
debtor in each case in the random sample.  Approximately 10% of these let-
ters were returned as undeliverable; these cases were replaced with randomly 
drawn cases from the universe of cases for the corresponding week.  After 
data collection ended, a few mailings were returned as undeliverable and 
were not replaced.  These instances reduced the final sample of debtors con-
tacted by letter to participate from 1,200 to 1,189. 
The debtors’ names and addresses were provided by AACER as part of 
the case information it gathers when it obtains court record data.  If a case 
was filed jointly, the letter was addressed to both spouses.  When debtors 
were contacted, we interviewed any adult person in the household, even if he 
or she had not technically been a debtor because a single petition was filed.  
We inquired, however, if the nondebtor spouse was very familiar with the 
debtor’s bankruptcy case.  Herein, the respondents will be called “debtors,” 
although technically a few were not debtors but rather adults living with a 
debtor. 
The letter of invitation for the study contained the required elements of 
consent for academic research on human subjects and explained the purpose 
of the study.  The letter told debtors that if they participated in the study they 
would be provided a $50 gift card to their choice of Target or Walmart.  A 
Spanish-language version was printed on the reverse side of the letter.  En-
closed with the letter were a participation form and an addressed, stamped 
envelope for the return of the participation form.  The letter also provided a 
toll-free number that debtors could call to be interviewed.  Upon receipt of a 
request to participate, an interview was scheduled and completed at the 
debtor’s convenience. 
About two weeks after the initial mailing, debtors who had not yet 
responded to the initial letter were contacted by telephone if possible.  
Telephone numbers are not provided on bankruptcy court records except for 
pro se debtors.  Public search engines and a for-fee service were used to 
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attempt to locate telephone numbers, but ultimately, valid phone numbers 
were only found for about half of the debtors.118  About four to six weeks 
after the initial mailing, a follow-up reminder letter was sent to debtors who 
had not completed interviews.  People who declined to participate were never 
contacted subsequent to their refusal. 
The telephone interview database permitted all data to be coded 
simultaneously with the interviews.  The questions were primarily closed-
ended, such that a specific response was selected to match a respondent’s 
answer.  Interviewers coded all responses to open-ended questions, as well as 
any additional spontaneous comments, into overflow.  The data set is nearly 
complete for all items for all interview participants.  There are few missing 
data, and refusals to individual interview items (captured by “don’t know” 
and “no answer” responses) were rare.  The interviews averaged forty-five 
minutes in length, although some were over an hour. 
The study gathered a second type of data to supplement the interview 
data.  For each completed interview, data were coded from the debtors’ bank-
ruptcy court records.  The records were downloaded from PACER, the 
government’s online access system for the courts.  These data provide a more 
complete profile of each debtor’s situation at the time of bankruptcy.  Varia-
bles include the existence, chapter, and date of any prior bankruptcy; assets, 
debts, income, and expenses; and demographic information such as home-
ownership status and occupation.  Details about the length and structure of 
the Chapter 13 repayment plans were also coded.  For each case, approxi-
mately 140 variables were coded.  A random sample of 10% of the cases (30 
cases) were coded a second time.  This recoding was blind—that is, it was 
done without the coder knowing that it was a recoded case and without ac-
cess to the initial coding.  I compared every variable for every case and noted 
differences.  Discrepancies were noted in less than 0.5% of the data. 
The data from these court records and the telephone interviews were 
matched for each participant and merged together for analysis.  I primarily 
use telephone interview data for the analysis in this Article. 
D. Sample Characteristics 
The study completed interviews with 303 debtors.119  Two interviews 
were conducted in Spanish; the remaining 301 were conducted in English.  
Demographically, the participants in this study appear to be similar to par-
ticipants in other studies, including the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy 
 
118. For half of the debtors, no phone number at all could be located, any numbers that could 
be located were disconnected, or it was confirmed by in-person conversation or answering-machine 
messages that the number was not for the debtor household. 
119. Appropriate sample size depends on the population studied, the incidence of the 
characteristics estimated, and other factors.  See FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH 
METHODS 40–43 (rev. ed. 1988) (discussing inadequate approaches to determining sample size but 
noting the absence of a single right answer). 
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Project.120  Generally, the debtors in this study meet many of the traditional 
definitions for membership in the middle class.121  For these analyses, data 
are presented on those interviewed because there was no statistically signifi-
cant difference in the demographic variables between the people interviewed 
and their spouses/partners.122  The typical (median) interview respondent had 
“some college but not a four-year degree.”  About three-fourths (74%) of 
households owned a home at the time of bankruptcy.  This is consistent with 
the idea that families choosing Chapter 13 have some assets that they might 
want to preserve in bankruptcy.  The average age of interview respondents 
was forty-nine years.  A male completed the interview in 38% of the sample. 
The race data are important in light of very recent work showing that 
African-Americans are overrepresented in Chapter 13 as compared to 
Chapter 7.123  Because debtors could select multiple racial identifications, 
and the full presentation of such results would be cumbersome, I used a pro-
tocol to categorize each interview respondent as a single race or ethnicity,124 
which essentially treated people as members of a minority group even if they 
also self-identified as white.125  Under this protocol, 53% of interview 
respondents were white and 36% percent were black.  Hispanics represented 
only 7% of the sample, and the remaining 4% of “other” included Asians and 
other racial self-identifications.  Based on the race data from the 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, these figures seem to approximately reflect 
all Chapter 13 filers.126  The largest disparity may be a lower number of 
 
120. See, e.g., DEBORAH THORNE ET AL., AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., GENERATIONS OF 
STRUGGLE 3 (2008) (reporting a median age of 43 for bankruptcy filers in 2007); Dov Cohen & 
Robert M. Lawless, Less Forgiven: Race and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, in BROKE, supra note 29 
(manuscript at 175, 177) (reporting that African-Americans are over-represented in Chapter 13 
bankruptcy filings). 
121. Cf. Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class: Bankruptcy and 
Class Status, in BROKE, supra note 29 (manuscript at 25, 25) (“Studies conducted by the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project . . . in 1991, 2001, and 2007 consistently demonstrate that bankruptcy is a 
largely middle-class phenomenon.”). 
122. I conducted t-tests for interview respondents and their spouses/partners for the age, 
education, and race variables; p-values were less than .05 for each variable. 
123. Cohen & Lawless, supra note 120. 
124. Although the U.S. Census considers race and Hispanic origin to be distinct, the interview 
gave Hispanic/Latino as an option, along with white, African-American, Asian-American, or other. 
125. The exact protocol was as follows: Respondents who indicated a racial identification of 
African-American (even if they indicated other races as well) were categorized as African-
American.  Respondents who indicated a racial identification of Hispanic but did not also identify as 
African-American were categorized as Hispanic.  Respondents who indicated white and no other 
race were categorized as white.  The category of “other” included the remaining respondents: (i) 
those who indicated white and a race other than African-American or Hispanic, or (ii) those who 
only indicated racial categories other than white, African-American, or Hispanic—for example, 
someone who indicated Asian-American as their only racial identification. 
126. For example, using the same protocol for racial identification as in this Article, there are 
36% African-Americans in the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project sample of Chapter 13 cases.  
Author’s calculations from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (on file with author). 
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Hispanic participants, although the only available comparison is to 
Chapter 13 filings—not terminated Chapter 13 cases.127 
The households exiting Chapter 13 were rarely one-person units.  At the 
time they filed bankruptcy, about half of respondents (49%) were married.  
Twenty-nine percent were either divorced or separated, and the remainder 
were either widowed or single.  Just over half (53%) of respondents had no 
children under eighteen years old at the time they filed bankruptcy.  Among 
the half with school-age or younger children, the median number of children 
was two. 
The response rate is always a concern in survey research, and rates are 
relatively low in telephone surveys compared to in-person studies.128  
Following the widely adopted protocols of the American Association for 
Public Opinion Research, I collected information to calculate several metrics 
for response rate.  Nonrespondents were divided into three groups: those 
never reached (noncontacts), those unwilling to cooperate (refusals), and all 
others (those for whom it would have been difficult or impossible to partici-
pate (hearing barrier, hospitalized, etc.)).  Using the most conservative 
metric, the response rate was 25%. 
The total sample was 1,189 debtors.  This number reflects the eleven 
instances out of the total sample of 1,200 in which the letter was 
undeliverable and replacement was not attempted.129  However, the study 
could not obtain a valid telephone number for 643 debtors, over half the ran-
dom list sample.  Because this was a telephone survey, and because the 
mailed letter is a requirement of the University of Iowa Institutional Review 
Board rather than a part of the study design itself, I calculate the response 
rates using two different denominators: the 1,189 debtors who were mailed 
letters, and the 546 debtors for whom the study had valid (or possibly valid) 
telephone numbers.  This latter group includes each debtor with whom the 
study made no telephone contact (live person or answering machine) but for 
which we located a connected, possibly valid phone number.  The group of 
546 debtors also includes people whom agreed to participate in the study but 
whom ultimately were not interviewed.130  There were thirty-three debtors in 
this group; these could be considered passive refusals or noncontacts. 
 
127. Using the same protocol as in this Article, only 3% of Chapter 13 debtors are Hispanic in 
the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project sample.  Author’s calculations from the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project (on file with author). 
128. Charlotte Steeh et al., Are They Really as Bad as They Seem? Nonresponse Rates at the 
End of the Twentieth Century, 17 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 227, 227–28 (2001) (reporting that the Council 
for Marketing and Opinion Research reports a 25% average response rate for all samples and a 12% 
response rate for random-digit-dialing samples for commercial telephone surveys). 
129. One hundred fourteen cases from the sample of 1,189 were replaced with randomly drawn 
alternates from the initial lists because the letter was returned as undeliverable. 
130. Of the 546 debtors, thirty-three returned surveys, called the 1-800 number, or were 
contacted and scheduled interviews, but they either were no-shows when called for the interviews or 
could not be contacted for the interviews after their initial agreement to participate. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965680
2011] The Pretend Solution 131 
 
 
As Table 1 shows, the final participation rate was 25% for the mailed 
sample and 55% for those with valid or possibly valid phone numbers.  The 
refusal rates were 7% and 16%, respectively.  Refusals were people who ei-
ther returned participant forms indicating that they did not wish to participate 
or verbally confirmed by phone that they did not want to participate.  This 
refusal rate would adjust upward somewhat using the passive refusal as-
sumption for the debtors who initially agreed to an interview but ultimately 
did not participate. 
 
 Table 1.  Response Rate for Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 
Mailed Sample  
(N = 1,189) 
Valid or Possible 
Valid Phone Sample 
(N = 546) 
Participation Rate 25% 55% 
Active Refusal Rate 7% 16% 
Possible Passive
Refusal Rate
(agreed to participate but did 
not complete interview) 
3% 6% 
Noncontact Rate 64% 22% 
Other Noninterviews 0.3% 0.7% 
 
The major source of nonresponse was noncontacts, as Table 1 shows.  
Debtors whose phone numbers were impossible to obtain may differ from 
those with obtainable phone numbers.  Younger debtors may be more likely 
to have only cell phones, which are generally unlisted.  In the general 
population, it is estimated that 20% of households rely exclusively on cell 
phones.131  Another source of nonresponse bias may be that debtors who 
were particularly angry or disappointed about the bankruptcy process were 
less likely to participate.  Finally, debtors who faced the most intense collec-
tion pressure or the most severe hardships may have cut off their phones to 
avoid dunning calls or to save money. 
To provide some measure of the nature and extent of nonresponse bias 
in the telephone survey, I coded bankruptcy court record data for a random 
sample of debtors who were eligible for the study but who did not complete 
the interviews.132  I then compared the respondents and nonrespondents on 
variables such as income, household size, total assets, total unsecured debts, 
total debts, and case disposition.  For most variables, there was no statisti-
cally significant difference in the two groups.  There were two exceptions: 
 
131. John M. Boyle et al., Cell Phone Mainly Households: Coverage and Reach for Telephone 
Surveys Using RDD Landline Samples, SURVEY PRACTICE (Dec. 9, 2009), http:// 
surveypractice.org/2009/12/09/cell-phone-and-landlines. 
132. Court records were coded for 150 nonrespondents, approximately half the number of 
respondents (303).  In the analysis comparing the two groups, the nonrespondents were weighted 
double to create groups of approximately equal size for comparison. 
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Among respondents (those who completed the interview), 27% of cases con-
verted to Chapter 7; the remaining 73% were dismissed from bankruptcy 
entirely.  Among the nonrespondent sample, 19% of cases converted.  
Because cases that convert to Chapter 7 nearly always result in the debtors 
getting discharges of their unsecured debts, people with converted cases may 
have different assessments of Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  I explore the data with 
regard to this point later in the Article.133  Also, those who responded to the 
study had, on average, lower actual monthly incomes at the time of bank-
ruptcy than those who did not respond.134  This result may be unsurprising 
given the $50 incentive for completing the interview.  It may be that re-
spondents with lower incomes at the time of filing also had lower incomes 
when they were interviewed, compared to nonrespondents.  This could have 
made the respondents more pessimistic about Chapter 13.  It is also possible 
that people who converted their bankruptcies to Chapter 7 were more likely 
to have lower incomes, so that the two differences reflect an overlapping 
group of people.  While the court records provide an unusually large amount 
of data on nonrespondents to permit checks for nonresponse bias, there may 
still be unmeasured nonresponse bias, such as by race or educational 
attainment.135 
IV. Findings: The Real Outcomes of Chapter 13 
A. Goals of Chapter 13 Debtors 
Chapter 13 offers debtors many legal tools for many kinds of debt 
problems.  Some kinds of secured debts may be written down to the value of 
the collateral;136 for other types of secured debt, most notably home 
mortgages, the remedy is a right to cure a default over a reasonable time.137  
Loans that are shorter than the plan can be re-amortized over the life of the 
plan.138  Similarly, unsecured debt obligations may be substantially reduced; 
if the debtor pays all of his or her disposable income for the life of the 
repayment plan, any remaining amount of debt is forgiven.139  Tax creditors 
may be paid as priority claims,140 effectively permitting a debtor to devote his 
or her income to these nondischargeable debts ahead of regular creditors.  
The point here is not to belabor the details of Chapter 13 but merely to show 
that its intricacies mean that debtors could reasonably have broad and 
 
133. See infra subpart V(A) for a discussion of how case outcome affected question response. 
134. The average respondent had a monthly income of $3,675; the average nonrespondent had a 
monthly income of $4,305, with p < .05 for this difference. 
135. The United States does not collect this type of demographic information, although most 
other countries do so as part of their bankruptcy forms. 
136. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006) (allowing modification of secured creditors’ rights). 
139. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
140. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
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ambitious goals for Chapter 13.  Indeed, the very premise of the system is 
that debtors can do it all: receive a discharge of their unsecured debts (just as 
in Chapter 7) but, in addition, retain their assets regardless of exempt status, 
write down or cure their secured debts, and enjoy the automatic stay for the 
life of the plan. 
Each interview with an individual who dropped out of Chapter 13 began 
with a series of questions on what that debtor hoped to accomplish with 
bankruptcy.  Debtors were asked to respond on a four-point Likert scale141 
whether a particular goal was “very important,” “somewhat important,” 
“somewhat unimportant,” or “very unimportant.”  Eleven closed-ended goals 
were queried.  Then debtors also were asked whether there were any “other 
things” they wanted to accomplish in bankruptcy and if they responded 
affirmatively, to describe those other things. 
The data are remarkable for the universal strength of debtors’ responses.  
A majority of debtors responded “very important” to nine of the eleven goals 
(all except “saving property other than a car or a home”142 and “dealing with 
tax debt”143).  The goals can be broadly grouped into categories: saving 
property, relieving creditor pressure, and improving a debtor’s financial 
situation.  Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents that indicated a goal 
was “very important,” clustered into these three categories (and showing tax 
debt separately).  At least a majority of debtors chose “very important” for 
every goal.  Crucially, these data do not include debtors who indicated 
“somewhat important.”  If that response option were included—effectively 
transforming the four-point scale into a binary one of “important” or 
“unimportant”—over 90% of debtors would have indicated that it was 
important (“very important” or “somewhat important”) to accomplish these 
goals: saving their home, getting control of their financial situation, getting a 
fresh start, and repaying as much as they could on their debt. 
The data show that debtors do not have a single purpose in filing 
Chapter 13.  When they enter bankruptcy, people have multiple goals.  While 
some might suggest that the large number of goals shows that debtors are 
unrealistic about bankruptcy, the counterargument is powerful: Chapter 13 
actually does provide tools for debtors to achieve each of these goals.  These 
debtors did not report ultra vires goals for bankruptcy such as “raising my 
income” or “never having to worry about money.”  Chapter 13 may have at-
tracted these families precisely because it did not require them to make hard 
choices—for example, between trying to hang onto a house subject to a large 
 
141. A Likert scale presents a statement then asks a respondent to choose one response from a 
range of options representing graduated increments of agreement, frequency, or evaluation 
regarding the statement.  COLLEEN KONICKI DI IORIO, MEASUREMENT IN HEALTH BEHAVIOR: 
METHODS FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 128–29 (2005). 
142. This is true only because just 16% of debtors said they had some other property.  Among 
those who did have such property, 67% indicated that saving that property was “very important.” 
143. This is true only because fewer than half of debtors owed tax debts.  Among those who did 
owe tax debts, 57% indicated that dealing with their tax debts was “very important.” 
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mortgage and getting a fresh start in their financial lives.  The findings on 
goals mimic the complexities and contradictions inherent in the structure of 
Chapter 13. 
 
 Figure 2.  Percent of Debtors Indicating Particular Goal Was Very 
Important to Accomplish in Bankruptcy 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 *Keep House is as percent of homeowners.  Keep Vehicle is as percent of car owners. 
 
To have debtors prioritize among their multiple and competing goals, I 
asked each debtor to select the “single most important goal” from the list of 
all goals that he or she had identified in the prior interview question as “very 
important.”144  Figure 3 shows the results of this question about the single 
most important goal of each debtor’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy case.  Over half 
(51.5%) of debtors said saving a home was their primary purpose in 
bankruptcy; this fraction jumps when considering only the responses of 
homeowners.  Even when considering the entire sample, including debtors 
who rent or live with families or friends, saving one’s home still overwhelms 
all other goals among Chapter 13 filers.  In the this subpart, I explore the 
home-saving goal in more detail and present additional data on the second 
most popular goal: getting control of and organizing one’s financial situation.  
The data show that these two objectives are the key goals for debtors who 
 
144. The vast majority of debtors only selected one response; if a debtor insisted upon giving 
two answers, both were recorded.  These responses were recoded to select the first named goal as 
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exit the bankruptcy system and establish a definite benchmark against which 
bankruptcy outcomes can be measured. 
 
Figure 3.  Most Important Bankruptcy Goal for Chapter 13 Debtors 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 303 
 *Keep House is as percent of homeowners.  Keep Vehicle is as percent of car owners. 
 
1. Save the House.—When enacted in 1978, Chapter 13 provided 
debtors with significantly improved tools to address defaults on secured 
debts.  The law’s special treatment of home mortgages reveals the govern-
ment’s support of home ownership.145  By the early 1990s, Chapter 13 was 
recognized as a way to effectuate the government’s home ownership 
policy;146 this understanding of Chapter 13 as a federal foreclosure-
prevention device continues today.147  Consumers have heard this message 
 
145. See Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on 
Mortgage Markets 4 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 1087816, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087816 (“The policy 
presumption behind bankruptcy’s special protection for home mortgage lenders is that it enables 
them to offer lower interest rates and thus encourages home ownership.”). 
146. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 238 (1997), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html (“Notwithstanding these ‘exceptions 
to the exception,’ the special protection for mortgage lenders in the Bankruptcy Code is relatively 
consistent with pervasive federal policies promoting home ownership.”). 
147. Marianne B. Culhane, No Forwarding Address: Losing Homes in Bankruptcy, in BROKE, 
supra note 29 (manuscript at 119, 123) (“Chapter 13 . . . was designed to help debtors keep their 
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too.  Despite a new push of government loan-modification programs and 
foreclosure-counseling programs, Chapter 13 is still probably the most 
widespread home-saving device in American law.148  A strong majority of 
Chapter 13 filers are homeowners, and most of these homeowners have at 
least one mortgage.149 
The households that drop out of Chapter 13 bankruptcy are 
predominantly homeowners.  About three in four households filing for 
bankruptcy owned their homes when they sought bankruptcy relief.  Saving a 
home was the main goal of an overwhelming portion of these homeowners’ 
bankruptcies.  Two measures reveal this.  First, 70% of homeowners partici-
pating in the study said that saving a home was their single most important 
goal.  Second, 94% of homeowners said that saving a home was either a very 
important or somewhat important goal of their bankruptcy.  This is very close 
to the fraction of homeowners who said that saving a home was “very 
important” in a telephone interview conducted as part of the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, which used a mixed sample of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
cases (including Chapter 13 cases that could have ended in a discharge).150 
American families are very attached to their homes, a reality that is easy 
to lose sight of in the face of news stories about strategic defaults on mort-
gage loans.  Several researchers have documented the strong desire of 
families to save their homes.  Eric Nguyen has identified the presence of 
school-age children as a strong predictor of whether a bankruptcy debtor 
gives saving her home as a reason for bankruptcy.151  Marianne Culhane has 
documented the social and emotional stakes of losing a home to financial 
distress: 
  Bankrupt debtors who lose their homes suffer immediate hard 
consequences: they must find somewhere else to live, perhaps 
persuading someone to take them in despite their recent or ongoing 
bankruptcy; they must pack up belongings and transport what they can 
afford to take or sell or abandon items too expensive to move or too 
large for their new residences; and they must leave friends and 
neighbors behind and move children away from familiar schools.  At 
each of these turns, they face out-of-pocket expenses and the 
embarrassment of failure in the eyes of their neighbors, children, 
 
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2274 (2008) (identifying Chapter 13 as one 
of the tools homeowners can use to manage a mortgage delinquency). 
148. See Jacoby, supra note 147, at 2283 (asserting that bankruptcy has become “an important 
de facto formal law component of mortgage delinquency management”). 
149. Porter, supra note 102, at 141 n.125; see also Raisa Bahchieva et al., Mortgage Debt, 
Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73, 104 
(Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005) (noting that most homeowners filing bankruptcy 
“face substantial mortgage debts”). 
150. Culhane, supra note 147, at 121–22. 
151. Eric S. Nguyen, Parents in Financial Crisis: Fighting to Keep the Family Home, 82 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 229, 247 (2008). 
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families, and others.  Losing a home is nearly always a step down the 
social and economic ladder . . . .152 
The families who exit the Chapter 13 system express similar fears about 
the consequences of home loss.153  In describing saving their homes as their 
most important goal, interview respondents focused on providing stable 
homes for their children.154  Other respondents made clear that paying their 
mortgages to keep their homes came before paying other debts, including 
those that were more unmanageable or expensive.155 
Chapter 13 provides tools for addressing defaults on secured loans other 
than home mortgages; indeed, the law is more generous for many other kinds 
of secured debt, permitting the debtor to reduce (i.e., cramdown) the loan to 
the value of the collateral.156  This legal right can be particularly powerful for 
cars, which tend to depreciate quickly after purchase.  Nine out of ten debtors 
owned a car at the time they filed bankruptcy, and 71% of these car owners 
said bankruptcy was very or somewhat important as a way to keep their cars.  
This is sharply lower than the 94% of homeowners who said saving their 
homes was either very or somewhat important.  Cars may be crucial for some 
debtors, particularly those facing an immediate repossession, but homes are 
the main story for families who exit Chapter 13.  Debtors wanted to use 
bankruptcy to avoid losing their homes because of their financial distress. 
2. Get Control of the Financial Situation.—The other primary goal of 
families was to use bankruptcy as a way to organize and get control of their 
financial situations.  Figure 3 shows that 12% of debtors said this was their 
single most important goal.  Organizing and getting control, however, was a 
secondary goal of virtually every family.  Over 98% of debtors said that get-
ting control of their financial situation was a very or somewhat important 
goal for their bankruptcy.  That this goal was nearly universally identified 
suggests that by the time they file bankruptcy, many families are in need of 
additional structure or tools to manage their financial situations; going it 
alone has left them feeling that their financial lives are out of control and 
chaotic. 
 
152. Culhane, supra note 147, at 129. 
153. Interview with Respondent W6-089R (“I don’t have anyone to move in with, so I needed 
to keep it.”).  All interviews cited in this Article are part of the Chapter 13 Dropout Study database 
on file with the author. 
154. Interview with Respondent W1-045S (“Keeping the home was the most important thing of 
all, for my children.”); id. (“I had just built this home for our family.  It was the first new home—
home that no one else had lived in before—that my children had ever had. . . .  I wanted to have it 
for my family.”). 
155. Interview with Respondent W5-126R (“It would be between keeping our house and 
dealing with the student loans, but if I had to choose one, it would be our house.”); Interview with 
Respondent W4-169D (“All of these were important, but if I had to pick one, keeping the house 
would be it.”). 
156. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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Although the response shows that debtors want order, the survey choice 
was broadly worded.  The high response rate may indicate that many debtors 
felt like they needed to change their financial lives and set themselves on a 
different path.  Debtors’ responses to other closed-ended goals help illumi-
nate the more specific ways in which debtors sought to create breathing room 
to improve their family finances. 
A bankruptcy filing triggers the imposition of an automatic stay against 
any actions against a debtor or his property.157  The purpose of the stay is to 
help debtors get control.158  But the stay also works simply to delay the per-
haps inevitable day of reckoning about one’s debts.  This is because creditors 
who wish to take action against debtors must seek relief from the stay by 
motion to the court,159 a process that often takes a month or more and in-
volves some expense.  This may deter some creditors from taking immediate 
action even if bankruptcy law gives them that right.  Thus, a bankruptcy fil-
ing means that most debtors will get an additional two or three months to 
postpone collection, even if the debtor makes no effort to move his 
Chapter 13 case forward.  If a repayment plan is confirmed, the debtor has 
even more time, because the automatic stay remains in place until the case is 
dismissed or a creditor receives relief from the court. 
Most debtors reported that obtaining additional time was something 
they hoped to accomplish with their bankruptcies.  Two survey questions 
probed this issue.  When asked how important bankruptcy was as a way to 
have more time to deal with their property, 75% of debtors said this was a 
very or somewhat important objective for their filings.  When asked how im-
portant bankruptcy was as a way to have more time to find additional money 
to deal with their debts, 78% of debtors said this was very or somewhat 
important.  In total, more than 85% of debtors identified one of these two 
additional-time goals as important.  Only a handful of debtors offered any 
specific information on how they hoped to obtain more money or the strate-
gies they needed more time to deploy with regard to their property.  It may 
be that debtors had never clearly identified the actual ways in which more 
time would let them find more money or deal with their defaults on secured 
debts. 
The final question that touched on getting control of one’s finances 
asked about stopping harassment from creditors.  Eighty-six percent of 
debtors said this was very or somewhat important.  This is consistent with 
research suggesting that dunning calls, rather than formal legal action, are the 
most powerful trigger for pushing a financially distressed consumer into 
 
157. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). 
158. See In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of the automatic stay 
provision is to afford the debtor a ‘breathing spell’ by halting the collection process.  It enables the 
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan with an aim toward satisfying existing debt.”). 
159. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 
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bankruptcy.160  Respondents described the pressure before bankruptcy by 
noting that “[c]alls were all day long and every day,”161 and speculating that 
“Wells Fargo had [them] on a speed dial.”162 
The overall importance to Chapter 13 filers of achieving breathing room 
from their creditors is highlighted by examining the cumulative responses to 
the four questions regarding bankruptcy goals discussed above: obtaining 
more time to deal with property, obtaining more time to find additional 
money, organizing and getting control of one’s financial situation, and 
stopping creditor harassment.  More than four out of five debtors (83%) said 
that all four of these goals were either very or somewhat important to ac-
complish with their bankruptcies.  The automatic stay in bankruptcy halts all 
direct creditor pressure from the very first day of the filing.  A bankruptcy 
filing is a uniquely powerful tool for a family that wants to reduce stress 
from debt collection efforts and gain time to develop a plan for its debt 
problems. 
B. Immediate Outcomes: “Good While It Lasted” 
The interview asked the debtors to evaluate whether their most 
important goal in bankruptcy was accomplished.  The debtors’ responses to 
this inquiry seem to suggest that Chapter 13 filers—even this sample of filers 
who dropped out of Chapter 13—were successful.  When read back what 
they had said earlier in the interview was their most important goal and asked 
how much they agreed that this goal was accomplished by their bankruptcies, 
debtors generally were positive about bankruptcy’s efficacy.  Over two-thirds 
(68.5%) of debtors said they either very much agreed (42.7%) or somewhat 
agreed (25.8%) that the debtor’s single most important goal was 
accomplished in bankruptcy.  Only about three in ten debtors (31.5%) were 
pessimistic about whether bankruptcy accomplished the debtor’s most 
important goal, saying they somewhat or very much disagreed with that 
statement about the outcomes of their bankruptcies.  These findings seem to 
support the alternate theory of Chapter 13—that consumers are exiting 
Chapter 13 voluntarily because they no longer need additional relief—and to 
indicate that the lack of bankruptcy discharges does not mean these cases did 
not provide help to debtors. 
Debtors also were positive about their decisions to file bankruptcy, even 
after their cases ended without completion.  Figure 4 illustrates responses to 
the following questions: “Looking back on the bankruptcy, how good of a 
decision do you think filing bankruptcy was?  Was it a very good decision, a 
somewhat good decision, a somewhat bad decision, or a very bad decision?”  
Very few debtors said that they thought their decision to file Chapter 13 
 
160. Mann & Porter, supra note 91, at 330. 
161. Interview with Respondent W4-457T. 
162. Interview with Respondent W4-218M. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965680
140 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:103 
 
 
bankruptcy was somewhat or very bad; only 17% of respondents selected 
either of those two negative categories.  It is possible that people were un-
willing to admit that they had made bad decisions; however, the 46% of 
debtors who indicated that filing bankruptcy was a very good decision is 
such a strong positive response that at least some portion of it likely reflects 
unbiased answers. 
 
Figure 4.  Debtors’ Responses to Whether It Was a Good Decision to 
File Bankruptcy 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 301 
 
The qualitative data suggest that debtors may instead be putting the 
blame for their bankruptcy outcomes on what they view as their own indi-
vidual situations.  As one debtor explained, “I’m not sure the decision was 
bad, but it just didn’t work out for me.”163  Debtors sometimes pointed to 
specific events in their lives that hindered Chapter 13 working out as they 
had hoped.  For example, one debtor who filed hoping to address his debts in 
order to retain a security clearance seemed to see the unrealized potential in 
bankruptcy, rather than the actual outcome, as the main criterion for evalu-
ating his decision to file bankruptcy.  As he said, “The decision was good, 
but I just didn’t get the clearance in time and lost my job.  If I hadn’t lost my 
job, I think that my Chapter 13 could have worked.”164 
 
163. Interview with Respondent W5-007R; see also Interview with Respondent W5-181G (“It 
was a good decision, but it didn’t work out.”). 
164. Interview with Respondent W4-365C. 
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The debtors’ positive opinions about filing bankruptcy counters the idea 
that many people are duped into filing bankruptcy or into choosing 
Chapter 13.  The large majority (83%) of people reporting that bankruptcy 
was either a very good or somewhat good decision suggests that people do 
not regret filing bankruptcy.  This does not mean that people accomplished 
their goals in bankruptcy or that their cases left them better off than they 
were before bankruptcy.  However, as compared to doing nothing, debtors 
believe bankruptcy was a good choice. 
On the question of whether filing bankruptcy was a good decision, 
debtors’ assessments depended on whether their cases were converted or 
dismissed.  Debtors with converted cases were more likely to say that filing 
bankruptcy was a very good decision (55%), compared to debtors with dis-
missed cases (43%).165  Because a conversion more closely approximates the 
outcome in a Chapter 7 case, this difference undermines the alternate theory 
that Chapter 13 without a discharge often is equally valuable to debtors than 
a discharge of their debts.  However, it is notable that even those whose cases 
are dismissed find some benefit in the process. 
Taken together, the data on accomplishment of the most important goal 
and assessment of the bankruptcy filing decision provide support for the al-
ternate theory of Chapter 13.  Most debtors who drop out of Chapter 13 are 
not hostile to the Chapter 13 bankruptcy system, even though it did not work 
out as intended.  To unpack the meaning of these data, I explore in detail in 
the next two sections the explanations that debtors gave for their answers to 
whether they accomplished their most important goal in bankruptcy.  Con-
sistent with the two main goals identified above, debtors primarily talked 
about saving their homes and relieving the pressure of financial problems.  
These qualitative data show more precisely what positive benefits accrue 
even to those who drop out of Chapter 13. 
1. Hanging onto Homes.—The homeowners who filed Chapter 13 had a 
simple, measurable objective: staying in their homes.  To evaluate debtors’ 
success in this regard, the interview asked a simple objective question: “Do 
you still own the same home you did when you filed bankruptcy?”  The re-
sponse shows that bankruptcy is absolutely effective at stymieing foreclosure 
during, and in the immediate aftermath of, bankruptcy.  Only 19% of 
homeowners lost their houses during bankruptcy or by the time of the 
interview for the Chapter 13 Dropout Study.  Nearly all of these home losses 
were due to foreclosure.  The 19% figure is still notable, however, because 
when these families filed bankruptcy, foreclosure was often imminent—a 
matter of mere days or weeks.  The typical Chapter 13 debtor owes arrear-
ages equal to six months of mortgage payments by the time he seeks 
 
165. The difference in mean responses between the groups along the four-point Likert response 
scale (very good to very bad) is statistically significant.  p < .05. 
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bankruptcy relief.166  Yet 81% of homeowners said that they still owned and 
were living in their home, a result that they attributed to Chapter 13 
bankruptcy. 
As described above, among debtors who owned a home when filing 
Chapter 13, 70% identified hanging onto the home as the single most im-
portant goal for filing.  Bankruptcy clearly met this objective in many 
debtors’ minds.  Homeowners described the immediate help they got from 
Chapter 13: “It stopped the sheriff sale and foreclosure on our house.”167  “I 
wouldn’t still have my home if I hadn’t filed.  It stopped foreclosure.”168  
Another debtor strongly agreed that bankruptcy was effective in dealing with 
falling behind on his mortgage after a workplace accident: “It kept us from 
losing our house to foreclosure.  At that time, my disability hadn’t been ap-
proved and I was not able to work as much.”169  This is the traditional story 
about saving a home in Chapter 13: a debtor has an adverse life event that 
causes an income shock; this leads to the debtor missing a few payments on 
his mortgage.  Chapter 13 gives the debtor time to catch up on those missed 
payments as his income stabilizes back to its prior level.  But regardless of 
the reason for the missed payments, most people who enter bankruptcy as 
homeowners exit bankruptcy as homeowners.  Chapter 13 clearly works to 
derail foreclosures and to arrest imminent home loss. 
2. A Rest for the Financially Weary.—By the time they file bankruptcy, 
debtors have often endured months of dunning and threats of legal action.170  
Eighty-four percent of debtors said they were very stressed about their fi-
nances right before they filed bankruptcy.  This stress partially resulted from 
contact with debt collectors.  Not quite three-fourths of debtors very much 
agreed with the statement, “Before I filed bankruptcy, pressure from debt 
collection bothered me or others in my household.”  This stress manifested 
itself in arguments about money and strain on marital relationships.  Among 
married debtors, 41% said they argued with their spouses “always” or 
“often” in the year before bankruptcy. 
Debtors described the way that bankruptcy addressed these problems.  
As one debtor bluntly put it, “I got the creditors off my back.”171  Some 
debtors praised how bankruptcy halted creditors immediately, seemingly 
finding that power over the collection dynamic to be a welcome reversal 
 
166. Katherine Porter, Arrears and Default Costs of Homeowners, NACTT Q., Jan.–Feb.–Mar. 
2010, at 15, 15. 
167. Interview with Respondent W4-370P. 
168. Interview with Respondent W4-383H; see also Interview with Respondent W4-143D (“I 
still have my house.  It gave me some time and stopped foreclosure.”); Interview with Respondent 
W6-201H (“Filing bankruptcy stopped foreclosure on our house and made it possible for us to keep 
it.”). 
169. Interview with Respondent W4-452R. 
170. Mann & Porter, supra note 91, at 306–07. 
171. Interview with Respondent W4-565K. 
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from the months before bankruptcy.  One debtor described her strategy: “The 
calls and harassment [have] stopped.  Filing bankruptcy is about the only 
way to stop them.  As soon as they hear the ‘B’ word and you give them your 
case number, they don’t call anymore.”172  Another debtor spoke as if de-
scribing the benefits of Chapter 13 to a prospective filer: “It stops everything 
in its track[s] and allows you to regroup.  It allows you to reorganize your 
future.  It allowed me to emotionally set myself up for success.”173  Filing 
bankruptcy gave debtors a welcome respite from constant reminders about 
their financial difficulties.  This break seemed to improved debtors’ sense of 
well-being in measurable ways. 
 
Figure 5.  Self-stress Evaluation of Chapter 13 Debtors Before and After 
Bankruptcy 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 303 (before bankruptcy); 302 (after bankruptcy) 
  
 
172. Interview with Respondent W2-029I; see also Interview with Respondent W4-479E 
(“After we filed, we only had one other person call and we referred them to our attorney.  It really 
helped stop the harassment.”); Interview with Respondent W5-129S (“As soon as I filed, they 
stopped calling.  If I did get a call, then I just gave them my case number and they stopped.”). 
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Figure 6.  Frequency of Debtors Arguing with Spouse About Money 
Before and After Bankruptcy 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 161 (before bankruptcy); 150 (after bankruptcy) 
 
As Figures 5 and 6 show, both self-reported stress and marital 
disagreements over money declined after bankruptcy compared with the 
period before bankruptcy.  Many fewer debtors reported being very stressed 
about their finances after bankruptcy than before bankruptcy; the percentage 
dropped from 84% to 35%.  Indeed, about one in six debtors reported being 
not stressed at all at the time of the interview (just after the termination of the 
bankruptcy).  This represents nearly six times more debtors with no stress 
about their financial situations than the number that existed at the time of 
bankruptcy.  Families that filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy had legitimate rea-
sons to be positive about their decision to file.  During bankruptcy, most 
families not only stayed in their homes but also did so while enjoying a better 
quality of life.  Free from dunning calls and anxiety about repossession or 
foreclosure, these debtors could spend time with their children and spouses 
and go to work without daily reminders of their financial straits. 
C. Final Outcomes: “Nowhere to Turn” 
The data are clear that most people who end their Chapter 13 cases 
without completing their repayment plans still see important benefits from 
bankruptcy.  Foreclosures and collection calls are halted, and families remain 
in their homes with less emotional strain from their financial problems.  
These are real outcomes, but they may be only temporary.  In fact, the home 
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Chapter 13.  Those were benefits of being in bankruptcy, not of having gone 
through bankruptcy and coming out on the other side.  The relief from fore-
closure and creditor calls will evaporate for most debtors without the 
protection of an active bankruptcy case. 
As the data show in the next two sections, most debtors will not 
ultimately achieve their goals of saving their homes or getting relief from 
debt collection.  Even just a few weeks after their bankruptcies had ended, 
more than half of homeowners were already behind on their payments and 
facing foreclosure, and more than half of debtors had already begun to get 
collection calls.  Most importantly, with the exception of the 27% of debtors 
in the sample who converted their Chapter 13 cases to Chapter 7, these 
dropout debtors still owed all of their outstanding debts.  These data are 
particularly depressing when put in context of the debtors’ case terminations.  
The interview data reflect the outcomes when debtors were interviewed.  In 
the following weeks and months, many debtors’ situations likely changed for 
the worse.  As creditors noticed the case terminations and ramped up their 
collection processes, more creditors would start to dun the debtor, and more 
debtors would again face the imminent loss of their homes to foreclosure. 
Debtors had some sense of this impending reality, especially when 
pressed to explain why their bankruptcy cases ended.  The vast majority of 
debtors disagreed that their bankruptcy cases ended because they had accom-
plished what they wanted to with their bankruptcies.  As shown on the left-
hand side of Figure 7, only 13% of debtors very much agreed with that 
statement, and another 13% somewhat agreed with that statement.  More 
strikingly, 65% of debtors very much disagreed that their bankruptcy fit the 
alternate theory of Chapter 13—a truly voluntary dismissal because the 
debtor had succeeded in the case.  The remaining 9% somewhat disagreed 
that their bankruptcy ended because they accomplished their goals.  While an 
incomplete Chapter 13 bankruptcy may have helped with the most important 
goal of getting more time in their homes or giving them some breathing 
room, such a case did not bring full relief.  The stay may have put off the 
dreaded home loss or collection suit, but these results did not last beyond the 
bankruptcy case. 
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Figure 7.  Debtors’ Agreement with Statements on Their Bankruptcies 
Having Ended 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 299 (accomplished goals); 300 (better solution) 
 
The parallel data on the right-hand side of Figure 7 show that about 
three-fourths (74%) of debtors that ended Chapter 13 bankruptcy did not 
have a better solution than bankruptcy.174  Having exited the legal system, 
few were confident that they had other ideas to address their remaining fi-
nancial problems—including the delinquencies on their mortgage loans and 
the collection pressures from their unsecured debt burdens described below. 
The minority of debtors (18%) who very much agreed or somewhat 
agreed with the statement that they ended their bankruptcies because of a 
better solution were asked to identify the better solution.  The answers are 
troubling.  Most debtors did not seem to be pinning their financial futures on 
reliable strategies.  Over one-third of those who said they found a better so-
lution were hoping to obtain loan modifications on their mortgages, often by 
negotiating with their lenders.175  Yet the rate of approved loan modifications 
outside of bankruptcy is very low.176  Many months after its rollout, the 
 
174. Limiting this question only to those whose cases were dismissed (for whom the question 
makes more sense than for those with converted cases), outcomes are only modestly more positive, 
with 71% of those debtors saying they very much disagree that they found a better solution. 
175. Seventy-two people did not “very much disagree” with the statement that their 
bankruptcies ended because they found a better solution.  Of these people, twenty-eight people 
specifically mentioned a loan modification or a negotiation with their mortgage creditor. 
176. Cf. Progress of the Making Home Affordable Program: What Are the Outcomes for 
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federal government’s HAMP program had achieved only 421,804 permanent 
modifications from among the 1,051,555 trial modifications that struggling 
homeowners undertook.177  Given that many people who contacted HAMP 
were never even offered a trial modification, loan modification has an even 
lower success rate than Chapter 13.  Considering that the debtors participat-
ing in this study already found Chapter 13 too difficult to complete, their 
odds for a successful loan modification appear low.178 
1. Home Today, Gone Tomorrow.—While most people (81%) who 
went into bankruptcy as homeowners technically exited as homeowners, that 
status was precarious.  At the time of the interviews for this study, six out of 
ten debtors who were still homeowners said they were not current on their 
mortgage payments.  The mortgage companies, freed from the waiting game 
of bankruptcy, had taken notice of dismissal of their borrowers’ Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.  Among those who were delinquent, half already faced a pending 
foreclosure action at the time of the interviews.  This means that a total of 
28% of all debtors who owned their homes at the time of the interview were 
at imminent risk of losing those homes to foreclosure. 
The interview also asked if debtors were having trouble paying their 
mortgage debts since their bankruptcies had ended.  Just over one-third of 
homeowners said “yes” in response to this question.  When the numbers are 
put together (lost home already for financial reasons, not current on 
payments/pending foreclosure, and struggling to pay the mortgage), the rate 
of home loss or threatened home loss exceeded 70% among all those who 
were homeowners when they filed bankruptcy. 
These are grim numbers, and debtors in this situation tended to be 
somewhat bleak about the benefits of bankruptcy.  As one debtor explained, 
“I’m still living in my home, but I’m going to lose it.  [Bankruptcy] bought 
me some time here, but that’s about it.”179  Another debtor noted that neither 
bankruptcy nor the federal government’s HAMP program could help him 
save his home. 
 
Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 90 (2009) (statement of Alys 
Cohen, Staff Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) (testifying that the number of mortgage 
modifications made with the assistance of HAMP through the fall of 2009 was “paltry compared to 
the volume of foreclosures”). 
177. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: ASSESSING THE TARP 
ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 49–50 (2010) (stating that there were 412,804 homeowners in 
permanent modifications, 12,912 homeowners who had left their permanent modification program, 
and 616,839 failed trial modifications). 
178. Some respondents had already tried and failed at loan modifications before bankruptcy.  “I 
was actually trying to work out a loan modification and ran out of time.  My mortgage company 
suggested that I file for bankruptcy.”  Interview with Respondent W2-064S.  Others described their 
frustrations with the loan modification process, even though they were just a few months into it.  
Describing his mortgage servicer, one debtor remarked, “They can’t get it together.  No one knows 
anything.  They all need to be fired.  We’ve sent in four different loan modifications and it’s still not 
right.”  Interview with Respondent W1-008D. 
179. Interview with Respondent W4-528L. 
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[I] was able to stay in my home for a while.  But [after] filing 
bankruptcy, I didn’t qualify for the Obama program.  I was unable to 
renegotiate my loan.  So it wasn’t accomplished really because the 
home was foreclosed on.  My wife left me and left me with a 
mortgage payment to pay on my own.  So there you go.180 
Another debtor sounded a cautionary tale about the loan modification 
process: “I still have my home, but I’m worried about losing it.  They called 
me at 10:00 p.m. the other night and the lady was asking me when I was 
going to pay $7,000.  I got a loan modification, but they’re still calling 
me.”181  A few debtors admitted that bankruptcy had been futile from the 
outset. 
Much has been made out of the special rules in bankruptcy for home 
mortgages, which are generally not subject to being written down to the 
value of the home or to having their payment terms modified.182  At least 
some cars, however, are subject to cramdown even after the 2005 Bankruptcy 
Amendments.183  Thus, we might expect that homes are a particularly acute 
example of the difficulties debtors face in using Chapter 13 to retain their 
assets.  To the contrary, however, the data show that debtors are even less 
successful at saving cars in bankruptcy than they are at saving homes.184  
Nearly three in ten (29.5%) debtors who were delinquent on a vehicle when 
they filed bankruptcy lost it to repossession or surrendered it to the lender.  
Among those who still had the same car as when they filed bankruptcy, 37% 
were delinquent on their payments at the time of the interview.  
Cumulatively, it appears that as few as 40% of Chapter 13 dropout debtors 
with delinquencies on car loans at the time of filing may have saved their 
cars as of the dates of their interviews.  The worse performance for cars 
compared to homes may be because the repossession process is faster than 
the foreclosure process, thus making lenders more aggressive.  Additionally, 
some debtors may have been willing to part with their cars to make a last sac-
rifice to try to save their homes. 
The crown jewels of Chapter 13 are supposed to be its tools to permit 
debtors to retain ownership of their assets.  On paper, and from a distance, 
those statutory twists and turns may sparkle, but up close—seen right 
through the eye of their beholders, the failed Chapter 13 debtors—the gems 
are fakes.  Two recent single-location studies report that home loss is very 
common among Chapter 13 filers.  A study of debtors who filed Chapter 13 
 
180. Interview with Respondent W2-007A. 
181. Interview with Respondent W1-008D. 
182. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (exempting many claims secured by vehicles from being 
stripped down to the value of the vehicle under § 506(a), but still permitting cramdown of such 
loans under § 1325(a)(5)). 
184. Seventy-three percent of debtors no longer owned the vehicles they owned when they filed 
for bankruptcy.  Of those who lost cars, 73% of debtors either had had their cars repossessed or had 
surrendered them back to the lender because they were in default on their loans. 
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in Broward County, Florida, in 2007 found that only three years after their 
filings, 43% of homeowners had already lost their homes to foreclosure and 
another 22% of homeowners were in the foreclosure process.185  A study of 
Chapter 13 debtors in Delaware in 2001–2002 found that 28% of homeown-
ers lost their houses despite filing bankruptcy and that the rate of loss rose to 
41% for those who had been delinquent on their mortgages for at least one 
year before filing bankruptcy.186  While such rates of home loss might be 
significantly lower than a similarly situated control group (those in financial 
trouble that do not seek bankruptcy relief), it is certainly far more than the 
grand hopes the drafters and advocates of Chapter 13 harbored. 
2. The Next Round of Debt Difficulties.—In Chapter 13, a discharge of 
debt is normally not given until all payments to be made under the plan are 
complete.187  This is a crucial difference between Chapter 13 and all other 
chapters in the Bankruptcy Code—one that harshens the consequences of 
failing to complete a Chapter 13 plan.  Examining this study’s sample of 
cases that ended without a discharge shows that people who drop out of 
Chapter 13 will face significant difficulties in managing the stress and pres-
sures of their unsecured debts without having received a discharge. 
On top of their past debts, these families continue to have the problems 
with income instability and uneven or high expenses that often led to their 
financial distress in the first place.  While these income shortfalls also plague 
Chapter 7 filers,188 Chapter 13 filers face a double whammy.  Ongoing bills 
continue to challenge debtors’ financial resources after bankruptcy.  In this 
study, 59% of respondents said they had struggled in just the few months 
since the end of their bankruptcy cases to pay bills such as medical bills, 
utilities, rent or mortgage, or child support.  Simultaneously, prebankruptcy 
unsecured debts remain problematic because they continue to exist and to be 
fully collectable.  Already, by the time of the interview, four in ten 
Chapter 13 dropouts had received postbankruptcy collection calls.  As 
creditors update their files to mark the case disposition to dismissal, debtors 
will have to deal with more dunning.  Because they did not discharge a single 
dollar of unpaid debt in their partial Chapter 13 cases, these families’ overall 
debt-to-income ratios remained, after bankruptcy, at the same unsustainable 
 
185. Joshua L. Boehm, No Shelter: Chapter 13 Debtors’ Home Loss in the Foreclosure Crisis 
18–19 & tbl.1 (Apr. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
186. Sarah W. Carroll & Wenli Li, The Homeownership Experience of Households in 
Bankruptcy, 13 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., no. 1, 2011, at  113, 123. 
187. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).  There is a provision in the Bankruptcy Code to permit a hardship 
discharge, but it is used relatively infrequently.  Id. § 1328(b).  Possibly, this is because many 
debtors eligible for a hardship discharge convert their cases to Chapter 7 instead. 
188. See Porter & Thorne, supra note 101, at 70 (noting that Chapter 7 bankruptcy “may offer a 
temporary refuge, but it does not generate sufficient or steady enough income to shelter families 
with chronic income problems from further economic distress”). 
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levels where they were.  As one debtor said, with a deep sigh, “I have the 
same income and same debts, and now I have to refile.”189 
Consistent with a lack of a bankruptcy discharge, many families 
reported that their financial situations had not improved since filing 
Chapter 13.  Figure 8 shows debtors’ self-assessments of whether their 
overall financial situations at the time of the interview had improved, stayed 
about the same, or worsened, compared to when they filed their bankruptcies.  
Forty-two percent of debtors said their financial situations had improved.  
However, many of those who were not struggling explained that their finan-
cial situations improved because they surrendered their homes or cars to 
lenders and no longer had to make payments.  While this change in financial 
burdens may well be appropriate and produce lasting benefits to families, it is 
difficult to square with the objectives of Chapter 13 or the alternate theory of 
success. 
Well over half (57.5%) of households said that their financial situations 
at the time of the interview were either the same as or worse than the time 
when they filed bankruptcy.  Despite its costs and burdens, bankruptcy did 
not propel these families forward into better circumstances.  It is particularly 
disheartening that more than one in four families said their financial situa-
tions had worsened.  Follow-up research on these families would offer 
insights into bankruptcy as a mobility path.  For these families, a very poor 
outcome from Chapter 13 could be the beginning of a downward spiral that 
could lead to sustained poverty.  Alternatively, if these families’ situations 
improved as additional months elapsed after bankruptcy, it would be useful 
to identify any social institutions that helped contribute to a reversal of their 
declining situation. 
The largest percentage (42.5%) of debtors reported an improved 
financial situation.  This finding suggests beneficial effects of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy (or at least the absence of deleterious effects that cancel out other 
positive developments in debtors’ lives).  The reference point for the ques-
tion is important, however, in deciding on the inference to draw from this 
statistic.  Families were making a comparison between the time of the inter-
view and the time that they filed bankruptcy—circumstances that were so 
dire that the families were prompted to seek legal intervention.  While im-
provement is certainly good news, it does not necessarily indicate that 
Chapter 13 is delivering a lasting fresh start.  Because the relief from creditor 
pressure was temporary, and ended when the bankruptcy was dismissed, lon-
gitudinal research at six months and one year after the end of the bankruptcy 
cases would help assess whether the improved financial circumstances re-




189. Interview with Respondent W4-123T. 
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Figure 8.  Debtor Assessment of Change in Overall Financial Situation 
Between Time of Filing Bankruptcy and Time of Interview 
 
 Source: Chapter 13 Dropout Study 
 Note: N = 303 
 
The debt collectors had already begun to pursue these households only a 
month or two after their bankruptcies terminated.  Forty percent of 
households said they had already received phone calls from debt collectors.  
The qualitative data also reflect the degree to which the prebankruptcy har-
assment is becoming the postbankruptcy outcome. “They started calling as 
soon as it was over,” explained one debtor.190  Many debtors missed the res-
pite of bankruptcy, as this debtor did: “Temporarily, [bankruptcy] got 
creditors and the IRS off my back.  But now that my case has ended, they’re 
all back.”191  Many debtors made clear that a lack of improvement in their 
financial situations as a result of Chapter 13 meant that they were in serious 
financial trouble.  “I’m still facing foreclosure on my house, and I’m 
probably going to lose it.  I’m still struggling to pay for things, and my case 
has been dismissed.  I have the same job and pay.  They just turned my water 
off today.  Things are still pretty much the same.”192  This debtor had no 
water in a house from which she was about to be evicted. 
Other debtors echoed that Chapter 13 had simply allowed them to keep 
falling behind each month because of a gap between their income and 
expenses.  These families struggled even during Chapter 13, experiencing 
 
190. Interview with Respondent W4-235M. 
191. Interview with Respondent W4-468R. 
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serious privations.  These problems only worsened after bankruptcy.  At the 
time of interview—normally only a month or two after their cases ended—
59% of families said they were already struggling with bills.  One-third of all 
those who exited bankruptcy were struggling to pay for food; similar per-
centages struggled to pay for medicine, doctor bills, and basic utilities.  
These outcomes are far from debtors’ beliefs about what Chapter 13 does to 
help people.  One debtor explained, “When I filed, I thought that I would be 
able to get a fresh start.  This didn’t happen.  Everything’s still the same.”193  
Far from a fresh start, a majority of Chapter 13 debtors exit bankruptcy in the 
same, or even worse, financial circumstances. 
The data show that most debtors did not actually succeed in rescuing 
their homes from foreclosure or in reducing their unsecured debts.  Indeed, 
the data suggest that increased collection pressure and new foreclosure fil-
ings were imminent for many families.  When bankruptcy sheltered them 
with its automatic stay, families got to enjoy the pretend solution of 
Chapter 13.  Not able to make their payments, these debtors were on the cusp 
of realizing the real outcomes of an incomplete Chapter 13 case: loss of their 
homes and renewed debt collection pressure. 
V. Implications 
A. Assessing Bankruptcy Outcomes 
Upon first examination, the data shown in Figures 4 and 7 may seem to 
be a paradox.  How could debtors say bankruptcy was a good decision, as 
reported above, and still report that they did not accomplish their bankruptcy 
goals, that the problems and pressures that led to their bankruptcies were still 
problems, and that they had no better alternative to bankruptcy?  The answer 
is that bankruptcy is a pretend solution.  After the bankruptcy stay let them 
reclaim the lives they led before financial distress (existences without 
foreclosure threats and debt collection), debtors were pacified into thinking 
bankruptcy worked.  But the concrete measures of financial health give the 
opposite indication: bankruptcy failed. 
The apparent paradox between debtors saying bankruptcy was a good 
decision but being in dire financial trouble is resolved when one realizes that 
debtors are evaluating bankruptcy against a benchmark of having done 
nothing.  In nearly all cases, the only alternative to bankruptcy was simply 
giving in and allowing creditors to take property, file lawsuits, and dun them 
for years.  While it may be understandable for people to evaluate Chapter 13 
against their prior situation of nonbankruptcy, “better than nothing” is too 
weak of a standard for policy evaluation.  When enacted, Chapter 13 was in-
tended to be a generous system that aids struggling families, not a least-bad 
alternative to inaction.  And today, addressing debt remains a pressing policy 
 
193. Interview with Respondent W4-250J. 
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concern.  Economists are concerned that future economic growth will be 
constrained because consumers will struggle to service debt with their in-
comes rather than engage in current consumption.194  Bankruptcy relief 
remains an important part of the economic system, particularly as other pro-
tections in the social safety net weaken.195 
From a policy perspective, Chapter 13 should be evaluated against 
Chapter 7, the other primary bankruptcy option.  The data on Chapter 7 show 
a discharge rate exceeding 95%.196  One in three Chapter 13 filings ends in 
discharge.  Among the remaining fraction, those examined in this study, only 
approximately 20% to 25% achieve relief without a discharge.  This works 
out to about 16% of all Chapter 13 filings ending in relief without discharge.  
Summing the 33% of discharged cases with the 16% of self-reported positive 
outcomes in nondischarge cases, I estimate the success rate of Chapter 13 to 
be less than 50%. 
Defenders of Chapter 13 may interpret the data differently.  They could 
suggest yet another possible avenue for debtor success that was not examined 
in the study.  They also could suggest that the study is flawed because it did 
not sample families that completed their Chapter 13 plans.  The latter is a 
weak critique.  In concluding that Chapter 13 works in less than half of cases, 
I make the assumption (unproven with data) that debtors who receive a 
Chapter 13 discharge either achieved their goals or that discharge itself is 
sufficient to call a case a success.  This assumption is surely too generous,197 
suggesting that Chapter 13 may fare worse than my findings suggest. 
 
194. E.g., Reuven Glick & Kevin J. Lansing, U.S. Household Deleveraging and Future 
Consumption Growth, FRBSF ECON. LETTER, May 15, 2009, at 1, 3, available at http:// 
www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2009/el2009-16.pdf. 
195. Cf. JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 182 (2006) (arguing that components of 
the existing social “safety net” were not designed to carry the burdens that they now carry and 
should be replaced with stronger alternatives). 
196. See David J. Adler, Chapter 7 and Its Role in the Current Economy, in CHAPTER 7 
COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 7, 29 (2009) (“[A]s a rule, individual debtors receive a 
discharge in more than 99 percent of Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases . . . .”); see also Chapter 7: 
Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (“Generally, excluding cases that are 
dismissed or converted, individual debtors receive a discharge in more than 99 percent of chapter 7 
cases.”).  Because a few Chapter 7 cases are converted or dismissed, I discount this rate to 95%. 
197. My own research on how debtors fare after receiving a Chapter 7 discharge suggests that 
the bankruptcy system does not ensure families will have stable and healthy financial situations, 
even in the first year after discharge.  See Porter & Thorne, supra note 101, at 117 (highlighting that 
nearly a third of families remain financially troubled in the year after filing for bankruptcy).  In 
addition, there are undoubtedly some families who received a Chapter 13 discharge but did not need 
any other Chapter 13 tools (that is, they had no secured debts).  These families may have filed 
Chapter 13 to take advantage of financing their attorney’s fees over the repayment plan.  Such 
families would have achieved equivalent debt relief in a much shorter period if they had filed 
Chapter 7. 
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Admittedly, there is no established threshold for success in a social 
program.198  Undoubtedly, for some legal regimes, a success rate of less than 
50% (probably closer to 45%) would be seen as a high success rate (for 
example, the recidivism rate among convicted felons).  In the bankruptcy 
realm, however, especially given the efforts of the last three decades to en-
courage or force people into Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7, the 95% 
discharge rate in Chapter 7 makes the 50% success rate in Chapter 13 look 
paltry.  It is also difficult to defend 50–50 odds as sufficient to satisfy 
America’s longstanding normative commitment to a robust fresh start for 
poor but honest debtors.199 
With American families carrying debt loads that would have been 
unthinkable even a generation ago,200 the time for pretending about the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code has expired.  Chapter 13 does not work as intended.  
America needs to design and deploy a radical new approach to addressing the 
problem of overwhelming consumer debt.  Tinkering at the margins of the 
1978 Code is only adding curlicues onto flourishes.  The system is already 
too expensive, with filing and attorney’s fees often being equal to about 7% 
of debtors’ annual incomes at filing.201  Revisions aimed at “fixing” 
Chapter 13 seem likely only to add further complications to the system, 
driving up attorney’s fees and limiting access.202 
The new consumer bankruptcy system should be much simpler.  It is not 
possible to solve every problem in a high-volume legal system.  
Undoubtedly, a simpler system would eliminate some of the “debtor 
friendly” tools of the Bankruptcy Code.203  In its place would be a system of 
 
198. See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest 
Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1943–44, 2022 
(2011) (comparing bankruptcy to disability and welfare and concluding that bankruptcy is 
significantly more successful). 
199. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (declaring that “one of the primary 
purposes” of the Bankruptcy Act was to permit the debtor to “start afresh”).  As the Supreme Court 
has stated, 
  This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being 
of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor 
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of pre[e]xisting debt. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
200. Porter, supra note 29, at 2, 4. 
201. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
202. NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 146, at 275 (“The complexity of the system 
prevents the people most in need of relief from receiving it.”). 
203. One possible solution to the problems of complexity and choice is a single chapter of 
bankruptcy for individuals.  This is not a new idea.  See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of 
Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 415 (1994) (“[T]he easiest solution to the problems 
that I have identified is to simplify the Bankruptcy Code so that consumers are not presented with 
so many choices. . . .  [T]he basic choice between chapter 7 and 13 might be eliminated.”).  Such a 
system would give consumers some of the key tools of Chapter 13, such as the ability to write down 
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rough justice, but one in which the rough justice is nearly universally 
delivered.  Policy makers need to move beyond the traditional model of 
sophisticated lawyers providing tailored legal advice and accept that cost 
concerns mean that consumers will have only very limited access to legal 
counsel.  To make that counseling worthwhile, lawyers need to spend their 
time gathering factual information from clients.  In the current system, coun-
seling by a lawyer who is guided by conventional norms of professionalism 
likely entails mapping out the twists and turns of the Bankruptcy Code to 
help the client consider options.204 
The new consumer bankruptcy system should reject the idea of broad 
consumer choice.  The idea of free and informed selection between Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13 was never realistic,205 given the hours of education and coun-
seling required to help consumers understand the benefits and burdens of the 
two chapters.  William Whitford has observed that this framework creates a 
new consumer protection problem within the consumer bankruptcy system 
because of inadequate processes to guide the choice of chapter.206  Most 
importantly, adding choices and options does not mean that people actually 
achieve additional relief. 
While this study’s data and its methodological approach are new, the 
critique of Chapter 13 is old.  The hard fact is that every single study of the 
consumer bankruptcy system has concluded that repayment bankruptcies fail 
to deliver on their promises.207  The prior critiques of Chapter 13 have been 
impassioned.  In a symposium on the book As We Forgive Our Debtors, 
William Whitford argued for the repeal of Chapter 13.208  Gordon Bermant 
has sharply criticized the gap between intent and achievement in Chapter 13.  
In his words, “The legislature, however benevolent it may have been, first 
created then repeatedly amended a law of debt adjustment that is ambiguous 
and convoluted . . . .  The result is a cycle of complaint, with each component 
 
secured debts, but would abandon the idea of a repayment plan and long-term court supervision.  
The metric for success would be sharply defined: a permanent reduction in consumers’ debts, 
something akin to the current discharge.  The National Bankruptcy Conference, a private 
organization that has focused on improving the bankruptcy system since the 1930s, is working on a 
proposed single-chapter consumer system.  I am a member of the National Bankruptcy Conference 
and am actively involved in the development of its proposal. 
204. See Braucher, supra note 45, at 167, 178–79 (noting that consumer bankruptcy attorneys 
cannot devote much time or energy to litigating points of law and that they do not do consumer 
workouts, but that they must advise clients on the choice between Chapters 7 and 13). 
205. See Whitford, supra note 37, at 88–90 (describing why consumers do not and cannot make 
an informed and self-interested choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and opining that informed 
consumer choice about bankruptcy procedure is not a viable option in most instances). 
206. Whitford, supra note 203, at 403, 406. 
207. See, e.g., AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 13, at 339 (condemning Chapter 13 as misleading 
and discouraging to debtors); STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 2, at 105–06 (decrying the deficiencies 
of Chapter XIII in rehabilitating debtors); Norberg & Velkey, supra note 34, at 476–77 
(highlighting the high incidence of repeat Chapter 13 filers). 
208. Whitford, supra note 37, at 88–90. 
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[judge, trustee, creditors, etc.] laying responsibility off on the others.”209  
These arguments against Chapter 13 were made by eminent scholars.  Yet, 
they failed to defeat the alternative theory of Chapter 13 as a “choose your 
own bankruptcy adventure” that permitted families to craft custom relief for 
their financial problems. 
In addition to poor outcomes, pretend solutions ensnare consumers and 
their elected representatives in a web of inaction.  In the bankruptcy context, 
the result has been decades of mistaken belief that Chapter 13—a complex 
legal system that gives temporary and illusory relief—delivers permanent 
and real relief to families.  The contribution of this Article is not to develop a 
specific reform proposal,210 but to argue that reform efforts should resolutely 
abandon Chapter 13.  This Article’s findings may invigorate policy making 
in the area of overindebtedness.  A simpler, redesigned system can articulate 
a crisp objective and build ways to test progress into the system itself.  While 
the new solution may fall short of its objective,211 the move away from a 
pretend solution can clear the way for new ideas and stimulate innovation. 
B. Features of Pretend Solutions 
The story of Chapter 13 that I tell in this Article can help identify 
generalizable elements of a pretend solution.  In the paragraphs below, I 
develop a skeletal framework of a pretend solution.  This framework will not 
always fit.  Many government programs are not pretend solutions.  Some 
programs have high rates of success; they are widely considered to be solu-
tions (even if not 100% effective), and data support that perception of 
success.  The opposite are nonsolutions, which are widely identified as 
failures.  Such programs may help a few families, but the data show that the 
 
209. Bermant, supra note 18, at 20. 
210. I am working on a proposal for a redesigned consumer bankruptcy system.  The core 
features of the system are to alter dramatically the pace of decision making and the timing of lawyer 
interventions in the process.  Building on prior work suggesting a 1-800-DONOTDUN system to 
shield families from the wear of debt-collection pressure, Mann & Porter, supra note 91, at 333, 
336, I suggest that the proposed law eases the ability of people to initiate a bankruptcy without 
lawyer representation.  In this new system, consumers would only be asked to make decisions about 
property retention and repayment after a period of breathing room from dunning.  The system would 
also feature automatic adjustments to repayment obligations if debtors’ income changes.  In my 
view, one of the most significant problems with the existing Chapter 13 is that it presupposes a level 
of income stability that is unrealistic in today’s economy.  See Jacob S. Hacker, The Middle Class at 
Risk, in BROKE, supra note 29 (manuscript at 218, 223–25) (reporting that the proportion of 
working-age families experiencing a year-to-year 25% or greater drop in income increased from 
12% in 1985 to 17% in the early 2000s and was projected to have increased to 20% in 2009). 
211. In critiquing the Chapter 13 system, I am not suggesting that Chapter 7 is perfect or that 
addressing overindebtedness is an easy task.  My empirical research documents the limitation of 
Chapter 7 for putting people on a path to financial wellbeing.  Porter & Thorne, supra note 101, at 
124.  Overindebtedness brings with it many consequences, some of which are nonfinancial and 
some of which are macroeconomic in scope.  I have written an essay about the difficulty in 
measuring the harms of overindebtedness, an important prerequisite to designing solutions for the 
problem.  Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 
2012). 
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programs have serious and widespread shortcomings in delivering on their 
promises. 
And of course, Chapter 13 is only one legal system.  The pretend-
solution architecture may need to be modified to describe a broader range of 
social programs.  The new concept of a pretend solution, however, can 
sharpen the assessment of social programs.  The term itself is a caution 
against assuming that a social program works in the absence of any data.  
Using the consumer bankruptcy system as an example, I identify five ele-
ments that contribute to a pretend solution. 
The first element of a pretend solution is that the law must have been 
genuinely intended to help a given constituency or to ameliorate a particular 
problem.  It must provide generous relief that people expect will work.  A 
law that is a farce from its enactment is not a pretend solution.  People rec-
ognize it as a nonsolution and agitate for alternatives.  The Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 is a powerful con-
trast to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.  The 2005 Act was widely criticized for 
its lack of consumer protection (despite its moniker),212 whereas in 1978, 
Congress offered up Chapter 13 in a sincere effort to improve debtors’ pro-
spects in bankruptcy.213  To qualify as a pretend solution, the legislative 
history and political negotiations of the law should evidence a desire to ad-
dress a social problem and not merely make an ineffectual statement for 
political purposes.  Perceived generosity sets that stage for a pretend solution 
because the assumption is that such largesse from the legislature will materi-
alize in the law on the ground. 
A second, and related, aspect of a pretend solution is buy-in from 
experts.  Experts have technical knowledge, often more about law than about 
the underlying social problem to be solved.  That is, they know the statutory 
twists and turns in the solution—such as all the subsections of the 
Bankruptcy Code—but they may have little to no data or knowledge about 
the people who file bankruptcy and the situations that lead them to file.  
When experts craft a legal solution, it is usually reasoned and balances com-
peting concerns.  This process, combined with a genuine desire to improve 
the existing system, results in a detailed set of complex recommendations.  In 
the pretend-solution framework, experts lend legitimacy to the law.  Experts 
are not easily attacked for partisan positions and help reassure lawmakers 
 
212. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for 
Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2006) (stating that the Act 
“commits two counts of intentional fraud in its name alone” in that it “does not do a good job of 
preventing abuse and also does not protect consumers but rather puts new burdens on all filers, even 
the worst-off who are clearly not abusers”); Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Bankruptcy After the Fall: 
United States Law Under S. 256, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 28, 39 (2006) (asserting that under the Act, 
“consumer lenders have been given the green light to proceed merrily along the careless path they 
have chosen”); James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 866 (2006) (“The 
principal target of the Act was the debtor.”). 
213. See supra Part I. 
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that the solution is a good idea.  In the bankruptcy realm, this role was played 
by both the 1973 and 1997 Bankruptcy Review Commission Reports, the 
National Bankruptcy Conference, and the bankruptcy trustees (who are nei-
ther debtors nor creditors).  As outsiders concerned with objectivity and 
achieving a principled result, these experts often remain dogmatically com-
mitted to the theoretical ideas that justified the pretend solution.  Even in 
light of subsequent empirical evidence to the contrary, experts are invested in 
promoting and defending a system that reflects their expert advice.  Ac-
knowledging the contribution of experts to pretend solutions does not suggest 
that lawmakers should ignore experts or that experts cannot design effective 
solutions.  The key points are more limited.  First, expert blessing of legisla-
tion makes it harder to later disrupt the assumption that the law is achieving 
its stated purpose.  Second, experts tend toward complexity in design, which 
inhibits assessment of the program’s efficacy. 
Third, complexity often accompanies a pretend solution.  While not all 
complex social programs are pretend solutions, the converse will nearly al-
ways be true.  This is because complexity obscures empirical assessment of 
outcomes and shields poor results from scrutiny.  In complexity’s wake, a 
nonsolution can masquerade as a solution, often for decades.  As the history 
of Chapter 13 illustrates, well-intentioned defenders of a solution can posit 
multiple theories of a complex law’s objectives and divert attention from se-
rious warning signs of system failure.  The more outcomes that are possible, 
the harder it is to discern the real outcomes of the law.  Complexity operates 
to protect the pretend solution.  This effect of pretend solutions is insidious, 
in part because generosity and expert input (both seen as desirable qualities) 
often lead to complexity. 
The fourth feature of a pretend solution is that those to be helped must 
get at least some initial benefit or believe that they do so.  By definition, the 
relief from a pretend solution is not sufficient to be a real solution.  The sys-
tem must deliver more than a bare promise, however, or those to be helped 
would avoid the system, and their advocates would protest.  The social 
problem would return to the policy agenda for new ideas.  Those actions 
would expose the solution as pretend, eliminating its harm and leading to 
alternate approaches.  The pretend solution endures over time because it is 
generous enough to attract people to the program and because it delivers at 
least an illusion of help.  This Article shows that in the Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy context, the help is partial and temporary, rather than totally illusory.  
The pretend solution pacifies the people whose problems led to the enact-
ment of a social program and lifts the burden to do more from policy makers, 
experts, and advocates. 
The final quality of a pretend solution is that it does not contain regular, 
transparent assessment of the program’s efficacy.  Lack of data can be a 
function of government bureaucracy, which may resist data collection as ei-
ther threatening or unrewarding.  Government mandates to collect data also 
may be largely uninformative.  The studies and data collection provisions in 
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the 2005 bankruptcy amendments yielded few insights and little data;214 more 
data does not necessarily add knowledge.215  A related problem is reluctance, 
caused by either the costs or the hassles, of researchers to move beyond eas-
ily obtained data on case termination to obtain more nuanced data on 
outcomes.216  Assessment of a program is also difficult when a sharp and 
fixed consensus on the program’s goal is lacking.  Complexity and generos-
ity can hinder assessment because when a program tries to do too much, its 
outcomes become harder to assess.  People may differ on which outcomes 
are worth measuring, as well as on the best way to assess them.  Instead of 
the debtor-survey technique used here, researchers instead might rely on ob-
jective measures, such as examining property records to verify home-
ownership in dismissed or converted Chapter 13 cases.  This study offers 
only one model of how additional data collection beyond legal end results 
can reveal effects of laws that were previously obscured. 
These five elements of a pretend solution help explain why some social 
programs continue, despite niggling concerns or sporadic naysaying that 
suggest program failure.  The framework of a pretend solution developed 
here may help guide further research on policy design and assessment.  
Testing the framework against other social programs may deepen and refine 
knowledge about how to expose or avoid pretend solutions. 
C. Identifying and Preventing Pretend Solutions 
In this final subpart of the Article, I expand the idea of the pretend 
solution beyond bankruptcy.  I use the federal foreclosure-prevention 
program (HAMP) as an example of a social program that avoided being a 
pretend solution.  I show how certain features of HAMP that permitted robust 
assessment of efficacy were critical to exposing the program’s weaknesses 
 
214. See Katherine Porter, The Potential and Peril of BAPCPA for Empirical Research, 71 MO. 
L. REV. 963, 972–74 (2006) (bemoaning the difficulties in compiling longitudinal data on 
Chapter 13 debtors and reporting the difficulties and delays plaguing the Government 
Accountability Office’s initial efforts at data gathering). 
215. In his paper on court data, Lynn LoPucki seems to assert that increased access to raw data 
would almost certainly increase knowledge.  See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System 
Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481 (2009).  Yet not all data nor all studies are useful.  In the 
bankruptcy context, the government has begun posting some additional data under the Open 
Government Initiative, and yet I am not aware of a single study making use of this information.  See 
Chris Haverstock & Phil Crewson, U.S. Trustee Program Posts Bankruptcy Data on Data.gov Web 
Site, EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs 
/2010/ abi_201006.pdf (detailing new bankruptcy case data sets and statistical summaries released 
by the United States Trustee Program). 
216. Such data were even more difficult to gather when Professors Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook conducted their study of bankruptcies filed in 1981.  They tell stories of purchasing an 
airline seat to transport a portable photocopy machine around the country to obtain court records for 
bankruptcy debtors.  Leon Neyfakh, Elizabeth Warren’s Unorthodox Career, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 22, 
2011, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2011/10/22/elizabeth-warren-unorthodox-
career/3AFEDVW9B40rgbF1bhBXoM/story.html. 
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and the need for policy improvements.  This illustrates why nonsolutions 
may be preferable to pretend ones. 
Pretend solutions may exist in a number of policy areas.  Low-income 
housing programs, special education, medical care for veterans, social secu-
rity disability, and foreclosure prevention are possible examples of pretend 
solutions.  Many of these programs are longstanding and reflect impulses to 
improve recipients’ welfare.  However, the programs pose delivery chal-
lenges and are mired in complexities that may leave them dramatically short 
of delivering on their promises.  The development of these examples is be-
yond the scope of this Article, and not just for reasons of brevity.  Rather, a 
key point of this Article is that both data collection and deep system 
knowledge are needed to untangle whether a program is working well or 
failing badly, and that the challenge in assessment is particularly difficult 
when a pretend solution exists.  The very features of a pretend solution—
generosity, complexity, expert participation, modest benefits, and data 
limitations—are what permit assumptions of success or facile assertions of 
efficacy to escape challenge.  Testing the pretend-solution concept outside of 
bankruptcy will help refine our knowledge of how pretend solutions develop 
and why they are able to mask serious deficiencies in programs. 
In contrast to a pretend solution, a nonsolution can be readily discerned.  
A nonsolution is a program that does not work (either at all, or much less 
frequently than expected); it is widely acknowledged as a failure.  There is 
dissatisfaction or frustration among those who were to be helped, their 
advocates, and policy makers about the lack of outcomes.  That situation 
gives rise to momentum to design a better system.  The federal government’s 
foreclosure-prevention program, HAMP,217 is an example of a nonsolution.  
The program lacks most features of a pretend solution.  Rather than being too 
generous, the program was criticized at the outset for being too onerous to 
consumers.218  The program was set up hastily, with little time to facilitate 
and incorporate the advice of experts, including consumer and homeowner 
 
217. See Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2011) (providing news and information about the HAMP program to consumers). 
218. See, e.g., Foreclosure Prevention Part II: Are Loan Servicers Honoring Their 
Commitments to Help Preserve Homeownership? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 
Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 638 (2010) (statement of Elise Brown, Supervising Attorney, 
Foreclosure Prevention Project, MFY Legal Services, Inc.) (“A process that is intended to be ‘bold 
and swift’ in order to ‘arrest this downward spiral’ of foreclosures . . . is the complete opposite and 
reflects a failed system in which servicers take advantage of the homeowners’ vulnerabilities.” 
(footnote omitted)); Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 19 (2009) (statement 
of Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury) (explaining six months after the program’s inception that reforms were planned for 
HAMP in response to criticism because “[w]e do not want eligible borrowers to fail the trial period 
because the document requirements are unnecessarily burdensome”); Karyn Datko, HAMP Is a 
Failure: Here’s Why, SMART SPENDING (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:25 PM), http://money.msn.com/saving-
money-tips/post.aspx?post=c124f733-e80a-4582-b236-0128df523ab4 (“Many [banks] complain 
that [the HAMP] requirements are too strict.”). 
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advocates.219  The result was that the program lacked a presumption of suc-
cess at its outset.  Equally important, HAMP had a testable outcome: to save 
houses from foreclosure.  The outcome was simple and binary.  There was 
little temporary relief to pacify homeowners because foreclosures were often 
completed even as people repeatedly called or wrote to plead for a loan 
modification.220  The declining housing market also ensured that policy mak-
ers stayed attuned to the program’s effectiveness.  Most importantly, perhaps, 
the President established a clear, measurable objective at HAMP’s 
inception,221 and funded HAMP through TARP.  All TARP programs were 
immediately subject to Congressional Oversight Panel reporting and 
monitoring.222  Report after report on HAMP, written in clear language and 
disseminated to the public through a media blitz, stated plainly that the vast 
majority of troubled homeowners simply did not get any help.223  As millions 
of Americans lost their homes to foreclosure, we know that the government’s 
loan modification program simply did not achieve its goal.224 
The HAMP experience, as well as the approach of this study to 
assessing Chapter 13, holds important lessons for policy design.  While there 
are myriad challenges to designing a program that delivers real relief, there is 
one relatively simple way to avoid a pretend solution: a requirement for 
regular, transparent outcome data must be built into the program at its 
inception.  This requirement forces policy makers to define more sharply 
 
219. See, e.g., Alan White, HAMP: Is It Helping?, CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 4, 
2009, 11:36 AM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2009/08/hamp-is-it-helping.html (arguing that 
“HAMP does nothing to address the necessary reduction in principal mortgage debt that is a 
precondition to long-term recovery of the housing market, and the economy,” and that “the 
Administration and the mortgage industry have vigorously resisted addressing” alternative 
solutions). 
220. See Andrew Martin & Michael Powell, Two States Sue Bank of America Over Mortgages, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/business/ 
18mortgage.html (reporting that the attorneys general of Nevada and Arizona filed a suit against 
Bank of America for “assuring customers that they would not be foreclosed upon while they were 
seeking loan modifications, only to proceed with foreclosures anyway”). 
221. In his speech announcing the creation of HAMP, President Obama said that it would 
“enable as many as 3 to 4 million homeowners to modify the terms of their mortgages to avoid 
foreclosure.”  See supra note 57. 
222. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text; see also Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty 
and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 727 (2010) (“After a year of operations, . . . 
only about 230,000 [of the expected three to four million] borrowers had entered into permanent 
HAMP modifications, and even these were not necessarily truly permanent.”). 
224. See Editorial, The Foreclosure Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/opinion/15fri1.html (“According to the latest figures, 4.2 million 
loans are now in or near foreclosure.  An estimated 3.5 million homes will be lost by the end of 
2012, on top of 6.2 million already lost.  Yet the administration’s main antiforeclosure effort has 
modified fewer than 500,000 loans in about 18 months.”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Edmund L. 
Andrews, $275 Billion Plan Seeks to Address Crisis in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A1 
(reporting on the Obama Administration’s claim that the mortgage-relief program would save about 
four million people from losing their homes). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965680
162 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:103 
 
 
what they hope to accomplish.  It may also require refraining from making 
public promises that solutions will deliver, to be colloquial, “all that and a 
bag of chips.”  Rough justice that is actually doled out may ultimately pro-
duce better outcomes for the population to be helped.  Exposing the pretend-
solution problem sets up the challenge for additional thinking about outcome 
assessment and data collection in program design. 
VI. Conclusion 
The data from this study reveal the serious failures of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.  There is no longer a vacuum of knowledge that permits 
alternative theories to excuse away the realities of Chapter 13 outcomes.  
Nearly all of the two in three families that file Chapter 13 and later drop out 
of their repayment plans do so in precarious financial straits.  The majority of 
homeowners seem poised to lose their homes, and families are already expe-
riencing an uptick in collection pressure.  These families still owe their 
unsecured debts, and they are out of ideas and options.  Some families may 
file another bankruptcy, some may simply avoid collectors for years, and 
some will simply tumble down the socioeconomic ladder, losing homes, cars, 
and their aspirations for middle-class prosperity.  Admitting that 
Chapter 13’s success rate truly is less than half is a crucial first step to 
generating a new bankruptcy system that is simpler, cheaper, and more 
effective.  If the pretend solution stays in place, another entire generation will 
need to heed the advice of the Chapter 13 debtor who warned, 
Be prepared for a rocky road.  It’s not an easy thing to go through.  It’s 
a longer process than what we thought it would be and there [are] 
unbelievable amounts of paperwork.  We had creditors telling us that 
bankruptcy wouldn’t solve our problems.  We wanted to believe it 
would help us, but maybe they were telling us the truth.225 
 
225. Interview with Respondent W2-075N. 
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